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This thesis sheds light on a hitherto neglected chapter in the life of Pierre Laval, one of
France's most controversial political figures in the twentieth century. Widely remembered as
Vice-Premier (Vice-President du Conseil des Ministres) of the Vichy government during World
War II, Laval is less known as the premier (President du Conseil des Ministres) who attempted to
solve the grave financial and diplomatic dilemmas dividing France, Great Britain, the United
States, and Germany in 1931. In that year, he engaged in one last grand diplomatic effort, before
Adolf Hitler came to power, traveling to London, Berlin and Washington, D.C., in order to solve
the issues of the international war debt, the world economic crisis, and the rise of nationalism
Germany.
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From Paris to London, from London to Berlin, from Berlin
to Washington is a pilgrimage among the capitals which
differs from the traditional methods of diplomacy. This
must be accounted for by the fact that new duties are
imposed upon those responsible for government as a result
of the crisis which unsettles the world and undermines the
morale of nations.
Pierre Laval, New York, 1931 1

1

"Address of the President of the Council of Ministers of France," Press Releases, 4 July - 26 December
1931, weekly issues nos. 92-l 17A (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931), 355-357.
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Preface

In choosing to study a controversial historical figure such as Pierre Laval -- VicePremier (Vice-President du Conseil des Ministres) of the Vichy government during
World War II -- one exposes oneself to a great deal of academic probing, eyebrow raising
and even hostility. This would be of no consequence if it did not challenge one's
historical objectivity. In my defense, my writing this thesis has nothing to do with
political affiliations nor sympathies. I have no invested interest in glorifying nor for that
matter in degrading Pierre Laval.
In all honesty this thesis originated in jest over a moustache I once bore. My
professor of diplomatic history, John David Treadway, jokingly remarked that my
moustache reminded him of Pierre Laval's. I was somewhat nonplussed, as at the time
the name "Laval" only evoked the dark years of the German occupation and French
collaboration with the occupant.
Nonetheless this witticism was not without consequences. Through a pedagogical
twist I do not recall, I wrote a class paper on the role of Laval during the Abyssinian
crisis in 1935 and 1936. That study showed me a different Laval, a man who was clearly
aware of the German threat and thought to contain Adolf Hitler's ambitions. To do so,
Laval needed Mussolini's support. Italy was essential to the Stresa Front, formed in

x

---:

cooperation with France and Great Britain, in 1935, against Hitler's expansionism. 2
When the Halo-Ethiopian War broke out on 3 October 1935 and world opinion turned
against Mussolini, Laval still hoped to save Stresa. 3 He sought a peaceful solution to the
conflict. In association with the British Foreign Secretary Samuel Hoare, Laval drafted a
plan, which, under mysterious circumstances, fell prematurely into to hands of the French
press. The Hoare-Laval plan was touted as a sell out to the invader. 4 The peace attempt
crumbled. 5

2

The Stresa Conference was held in April 1935. For the text of the Stresa Agreement consult: Documents
on International Affairs 1935, ed. John W. Wheeler-Bennett (London: Oxford University
Press, 1936), 80-82.
Further reading: Pierre-Etienne Flandin, Politiquefranraise (1919-1940) (Paris: Les Editions
Nouvelles, 1947). Leon Noel, Les Illusions de Stresa: L'Italie abandonnee a Hitler (Paris: France Empire,
1975). Charles de Chambrun, Tradition et Souvenirs (Paris: Flammarion, 1952). Nicholas Rostow, Anglo
French Relations, 1934-1936 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984). Esmonde Robertson, Mussolini as
Empire Builder: Europe and Africa, 1932-1936 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977).
3

The Stresa Front was already shaken by the Anglo-German naval agreement of 18 June 1935 which
regulated naval strength between Germany and England in the ratio of35 to 100. The signature of this
agreement on the anniversary date of the Anglo-Prussian victory over France at Waterloo was a diplomatic
coup for Hitler, as it weakened the Anglo-French alliance.

4

Two journalists, Genevieve Tabouis and Pertinax (Andre Geraud) obtained the text. The leak(s)
certainly came from the Italophobe faction at the Quai d'Orsay; whether it was Alexis Leger (doubtful) or a
secretary remains a mystery. No claim was ever substantiated.
5

For the only complete correspondence between Laval and Mussolini regarding this affair consult Benito
Mussolini, Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini, vol. XXVII, Dall'Inaugurazione Della Provincia Di Littoria
Alla Proc/amazione Dell'Impero (19 Dicembre 1934-9 Maggio 1936), eds. Edoardo and Duilio Susmel
(Florence: La Fenice, 1951), 287.
For further reading on the Abyssinian crisis and the Hoare-Laval affair; see Henderson B.
Braddick, "The Hoare-Laval Plan: A Study in International Politics," European Diplomacy Between Two
Wars, 1919-1939, ed. Hans W. Gatzke (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1972). Arnod Wolfers, Britain and France
between Two Wars, Conflicting Strategies of Peace from Versailles to World War !!(New York: Norton,
1966). Thomas M. Verich, The European Powers and the Italo-Ethiopian War 1935-1936, A Diplomatic
Study (Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary Publications, 1980). James Dugan and Laurence Lafore, Days of
Emperor and Clown, The Jtalo-Ethiopian War 1935-1936. Dennis Mack Smith, Mussolini (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1982).
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Damage done to the moral standing of Laval was dreadful, and some historians
have traced the origins of Laval's collaboration with the Axis to these events. 6 Such
analysis overlooked the foundation of Laval's policy: the maintenance of a Franco-Italian
alliance to contain Germany and to deal with it from a position of strength. 7 As to the
immorality of an alliance between Democratic France and Fascist Italy, it was not a
concern voiced by many until the African adventure.
However unfortunate its outcome, the affair did show that Laval realized the threat
represented by Hitler and sought to oppose him -- an unusual action for someone who
would be presented as a henchman of Nazi aspirations. And this was not an isolated
action. Laval, though anti-Bolshevik, was also part of a concerted effort to achieve
entente with the Soviet Union, still with the intent of controlling Hitler. He even traveled
to Moscow in 1935 and met with Stalin. 8

6

This negative vision of the role of Laval is found in V. Potiemkine's work. V. Potiemkine, I. Mintz, A.
Pankratova, N. Koltchanovski and E. Tarle, Histoire de la Diplomatie, tome 3, 1919-1939 (Paris: Librairie
de Medecis, 1947). While it is understandable that historians, especially Soviet ones, so shortly after the
war failed to be objective, it is rather puzzling in the case of more recent authors. Nicholas Rostow wrote
that Laval's dealings over Abyssinia "were steps to Vichy and collaboration after 1940;[... ]and to the
crystallization of his reputation as an amoral manipulator and traitor" Nicholas Rostow, Anglo-French
Relations, 1934-36 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1984), 78.
7

William I. Shorrock, From Ally to Enemy, the Enigma ofFascist Italy in French Diplomacy, 1920-1940
(Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1988),167-169.
8

William Evans Scott, despite his dislike of Laval, offered an interesting analysis of the Franco-Soviet
Pact. Scott wrote in his preface that he offered a look at Laval "before he decided to serve his country at
the side of the devil." Williams Evans Scott, Alliance Against Hitler, The Origins of the Franco-Soviet
Pact (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1962), ix.
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This concern, about German Nationalism and Hitler, was already found in 1931,
and this one of the reasons I chose to this particular period for this study. Another reason
was because 1931 was the first time Pierre Laval served as President du Conseil de
l'Assemblee Nationale (the Third Republic title for a prime minister). Laval would head
three consecutive governments from 27 January 1931to21February1932. The first
lasted until the presidential elections of May 1931; the second had to be recast in 12-14
January 1932 because of the death of War Minister Andre Maginot. Laval's third
government lasted but a few weeks, Laval would not return as Premier for another three
years. By Third Republic standards, a stewardship of over a year was a long and stable
government. 9 Farthest removed in time from his role during World War II, Laval's first
term as premier was a dynamic year for person to person diplomacy: Laval that year
traveled to London, Berlin, and Washington and met with a number of figures of state,
with whom we shall acquaint ourselves. Ninety thirty-one saw one of the ultimate grand
diplomatic efforts before Hitler came to power.
To my knowledge this is the first study entirely dedicated to Pierre Laval's first term
as premier. The difficulties for this inquiry reside in the lack of available documentation.

9

Governments in the Third Republic were very unstable. The executive power lay in the hands of the
President du Conseil (premier). In order to be able to govern the premier needed a majority in the
Assemblee Nationale. Unfortunately not one party ever gathered enough seats to secure a majority. All
governments were supported by coalitions which would disintegrate over the slightest disagreement and
thus cause the collapse of the government. The President de la Republique was a sort of constitutional
"monarch," a post "given" to a deserving deputy or senator by their peers. The presidency had the authority
to nominate the premier and a certain power of influence. For the list of French presidents and Premiers
between 18 February 1906 and 10 July 1940 see Appendix B on page 165. For more on the Third Republic
and the political parties in France, see Appendix Con page 168.
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First, a considerable part of the archives of the Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres
concerning the 1930s was burned in the courtyard of the Quai d'Orsay in May 1940 so
they would not fall in German hands. Most of the remaining holdings were evacuated,
but were lost or destroyed in the chaos generated by the German invasion. The archives
have since then been partially, but inadequately, reconstituted from documents held in
France's legations. 10 The available documentation for the year 1931 consisted of a few
dispatches from French Ambassador Paul Claudel in Washington, as well as dispatches
from French ambassadors in Central Europe, and some undated memoranda. 11 Also,
indelicate hands have repeatedly stolen documents despite the security measures anyone
who has done research at the Quai d'Orsay can attest to. 12
The lack of documentation can also be imputed to Laval himself. Laval was a
verbal figure who wrote relatively little, which suited his taste for secrecy. 13 His
diplomatic style reflected that as well. He preferred to talk directly on the telephone
rather than pass through the conventional diplomatic channels.

10

Martin de Framond and Helene Servant, lnventaire de la Collection des Papiers 1940 (Paris:
lmprimerie Nationale, 1990) Introduction, no page number.

11
Archives Diplomatiques du Ministeres des affaires Etrangeres, Paris. Microfilm, Serie Y:
Internationale, 1918-1940. Copie P, vol. 61, Vues 100. Serie: PA AP 166 Tardieu. Copie P, vol. 488,
Vues 354.
12

Martin de Framond and Helene Servant, Introduction, no page number.

13

Fred Kupferman, Laval 1883-1945 (Paris: Balland, 1987), 75.
XIV

A great offender against the search for truth was no doubt France's post-war justice
system. The trial set up to judge Pierre Laval for his actions during the occupation was a
tragic farce. Judge, prosecutor, and jury were all, openly, hostile to the accused. Laval
and his lawyers were prevented from organizing a defense. They were denied access to
the terms of the prosecution, personal archives, and any other documentation. Laval was
also prevented from testifying on his own behalf.
Pierre Laval refused to take part in the tomfoolery and ceased to appear in the
courtroom. Equally disgusted, the defense lawyers followed suit. Unperturbed, the
pretense of justice followed its course. Laval was promptly sentenced to death and shot
just in time for the elections and referendum of 21 October 1945. 14
The only memoirs Laval left were the notes written on scrounged pieces of paper in
the obscurity of his seedy cell. Laval's daughter Josee gathered these notes and censored
rebuttals and published them. 15 Unfortunately for the purpose of this thesis, these

14
For a complete treatment of the "trial" Rene de Chambrun ... et cefut un crimejudiciaire... Le "Proces"
Laval (Paris: France-Empire, 1984) also by Laval's Attorney Jacques Baraduc, Dans la Cellule de Pierre
Laval (Paris: Self, 1948) and Jacques Baraduc, I 5 Oct ob re I 945, Pierre Laval Devant la Mort (Paris:
Pion, 1970).
In an ultimate protest Laval swallowed cyanide the morning of his execution. Refusing to be
robbed of their grim prize, the "authorities" had him brought back to life to be shot a few hours later at
12:20 p.m., 16 October 1945. "Le Courier De L'Ouest A 50 Ans, Regards sur l'Histoire et notre histoire,"
Le Courrier De L'Ouest (Angers), 25 November 1994.

15

Pierre Laval, Laval Parle, Notes et Memoires Rediges par Pierre Laval dans sa Cellule, avec une
Preface de sa jil/e, et de nombreux document inedits (Geneve: Les Editions du Cheval Aile, 1947) and in
English, Pierre Laval, The Unpublished Diary of Pierre Laval, introduction by Josee Laval, Countess R. de
Chambrun (London: Falcon Press, 1948). Josee Laval and her husband Rene de Chambrun have dedicated
much of their lives to rehabilitating the memory of Pierre Laval.

xv

"memoirs" dealt essentially with the accusations of the prosecution and little with the
year 1931.
This display of pseudo justice by the enemies of Laval was reckless and absurd for
they lost the moral high ground. Even if Laval was guilty, his hurried elimination could
only raise doubts and questions. What were the accusers of Laval trying to hide? Were
they trying to conceal the portion of success the Vichy government had? Yes, French
policemen arrested and turned over Jewish men, women, and children to the SS. Yes,
there were transit and internment camps in France. Yes, the Mil ice tracked and
eliminated the partisans. These horrors are undeniable. But a greater number of Jews in
France escaped the Holocaust than anywhere else in occupied Europe. 16 On the whole
France fared much better economically than any other occupied nation -- occupied being
a key word here.
Perhaps even more troubling was Laval's seeming awareness that serving in a
government in France under German occupation would mean, if not death, at least
imprisonment when France would regain her sovereignty. It meant not only danger to

16

76,000 Jews were deported from France, less than 3,000 would return. However 254,000 or 75 percent
of the Jews in France survived, while only 50 percent survived in Belgium and 15 percent in the
Netherlands. On the other hand, in percentages only Bulgaria with seventeen percent or 11,500 deported,
Denmark with 7 percent or 420 deported and Finland with only IO deported(!) fared the best in this grim
tally. For the most complete treatment of the Jews deported from France: Serge Klarsfeld, Le memorial de
la deportation des ju ifs de France (Paris: Klarsfeld, 1978) or Serge Klarsfeld, Memorial to the Jews
deported from France, 1942-1944: Documentation of the Deportation ofthe Victims ofthe Final Solution
in France (New York: B. Klarsfeld Foundation, 1983).
XVI

himself but also to those that surrounded him. 17 In the early days of the occupation Laval
had sent one of his assistants, Pierre Destribatz, away to Syria, then under French
mandate. When this assistant reported for a new assignment after the fall of Syria to the
allies, Laval was surprised. "Quesque tu fouts la?" Laval reportedly interjected. After a
brief discussion Laval convinced his assistant that it would be better for him to stay away
from him, in effect saving his assistant from the accusation of collaboration and possibly
his life. 18 Even Laval's wife, Jeanne, pronounced herself against his participating in the
Vichy government, according to Laval's testimony after the war. 19
Because his "trial" was botched, the responsibility of Laval, good or ill, was never
objectively established. How much did Laval know? How could he bear the daily
humiliations, the ruthless repression of student protests, the hostage taking, the phony
trials, the deportations, the executions, at the hands of the occupant? If collaboration in
the face of the disaster of May-June 1940, when Germany seemed about to win the war,
is somehow understandable, why did he persist after Stalingrad, the allied landing in
Africa, Sicily, or Normandy? If he had been allowed to testify, Laval might have replied
publicly as he stated privately to his attorney Yves Frederic Jaffre:

17

The sentiment that participating in the Vichy government was lethal was widespread. Jacques Le Roy
Ladurie who served in the Laval government as minister of Agriculture and supplies for five months before
entering the resistance recorded many a remark in that sense. Jacques Le Roy Ladurie, Memoires, 19021945 (Paris: Flammarion/Plon, 1997), 305, 406.
18

Monsieur Pierre Daubin, nephew of Pierre Destribatz. Conversation with Monsieur Daubin, June 1991.

19

"Portrait de Madame Laval par Pierre Laval" in Chambrun, Laval devant l'histoire, 384.
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When it came to France, I have all the egocentrisms and all the ambitions. I
wished a peace that would have left intact our territory and our empire. I
wanted to reduce to a minimum the sacrifices imposed on our country by the
occupation. Was it a crime?20
In eliminating the key witness, the provisional government of Charles de Gaulle made the
quest for truth very difficult.
The reason I insist on reviewing this period in the life of Laval in the preface, is that
it shaped the opinion of generations of historians. John W. Wheeler-Bennett, for
example, in a book published in 1932, simply "regretted" that "French adherence to the
Hoover Plan should have dragged on." 21 By 1974, however, the same author, treating the
same subject, singled out Laval for criticism. He accused him of "ruining" and
"wrecking" the Hoover Moratorium. 22 Wheeler-Bennett was, and is, not alone in judging
the entire career of Laval through the prism of World War II. Maurice Torres wrote a
vicious, largely unsubstantiated, indictment of Laval while in the United States in 1941. 23
Authors as David Thompson, a Cambridge don no less, then liberally quoted Torres'

20

"Quand ii s'agit de la France, j'ai tous Jes egoism es et toutes Jes ambitions. Je souhaitais une paix qui
nous laisse intacts notre territoire et notre empire. Je voulais reduire au minimum Jes sacrifices imposes a
notre pays par !'occupation. Etait-ce un crime?" Pierre Laval in Yves Frederic Jaffre JI ya cinquante ans ...
Pierre Laval: Le proces qui n'a pas eu lieu (Paris: Albin Michel, Not published at the time this was
written).

21

John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Disarmament and Security Since Locarno, 1925-1931; Being the Political
and Technical Background of the General Disarmament Conference, 1932 (New York: Macmillan, 1932),
339.
22

John Wheeler-Bennett, Knaves, Fools and Heroes, in Europe Between the Wars (New York:
Macmillan, 1974), 47.

23

Maurice Torres, La France Trahie, Pierre Laval (New York: Brentano's, 1943).
XVlll

words taking them at face value! 24 Louise Weiss, close to Aristide Briand, never thought
much of Laval and seemed to find evidence of base collusion with Germany as early as
1931! 25
While it might not be possible to show Laval as he might have appeared to his
contemporaries in 1931, this study aims to show Laval, the diplomat, as accurately, and
impartially, as possible. Not surprisingly, in studying Pierre Laval I have found
contradictory testimonies. When sources were reliable, I have often included all versions
either in the text itself or in a footnote.
Plenty has been written on Pierre Laval, but most authors have focussed their efforts
on the somber years of the occupation. Laval's first presidency was studied, no doubt but
no one stopped to see what Laval intended to achieve. Because of Laval's reserve, there
probably never existed a document entitled "My solutions for the ills of Europe."
Nevertheless, this research unearthed Laval's diplomatic purposes in the year 1931.
Granted, it was not as "sexy" as the 1928 Kellogg-Briand pact to outlaw war. It was
nonetheless, an answer to Europe's ills which the reader is now invited to discover.
A portrait of a scoundrel might have been more electrifying. Unfortunately, I can
only offer the reader a year in the life of Pierre Laval, politician, statesman and diplomat.

24

David Thompson, Two Frenchmen, Pierre Laval and Charles de Gaulle (London, The Cresset Press,
1951).

25

Louise Weiss, Combats pour L'Europe (Paris: Peyot, 1968).
XIX

All efforts have been made to make this study error-free. Any oversights in this
regard are solely my responsibility and in no way attributable to the editors. By the same
token, unless noted otherwise, all translations are my own.
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CHAPTER
I

FROM PUPIL TO PRESIDENT

The year 1931 was the midpoint between World War I (1914-1918) and World War
II (1939-1945) and in retrospect seemed far removed from both conflicts. But all who
lived the inter-war years faced constant reminders of the War that had passed and the war
that might be -- the peace negotiations ( 1918-1920); the occupation of the Ruhr ( 1923 ),
the war debt negotiations with the Dawes Plan (1924) and the Young Plan (1929); the
occupation of the Rhineland (1918-1930); the invasion of Manchuria (1931), the advent
of Adolf Hitler (1933); the parades of the veterans; the tirades of the politicians and the
demagogues; the missing husbands, fathers, brothers or sons; the crippled and the gassed;
the hate and the thirst of vengeance -- nothing but an interlude between two bloodbaths.
Even the literary world seemed unable to bring cheer to the year 1931. Antoine de
Saint Exupery published his grim Vol de nuit, Charles Maurras peddled hate in Au signe

de Flore, and Jean Giono expressed the tragedy of the War in Le Grand Troupeau. 1

1

Antoine de Saint Exupery, Vol de Nu it (Paris: Gallimard, 1931 ). Charles Maurras, Au Signe de Flore,
souvenir de vie politique,/'affaire Dreyfus, lafondation de /'Action Franr;aise. (Paris: Les <Euvres
Representatives, 1931 ). Jean Giono, Le Grand Troupeau (Paris: Gallimard, 1931 ).
The movie theaters played Rene Clair's bitter comedy A nous la liberte. This movie would inspire
Chaplin's Modern Times.

1

Yet not all was bleak, Josephine Baker was spreading cheer over the radio waves
with J'ai deux amours and other songs. The fabulous Exposition Coloniale showed to
more than six million visitors the wealth and diversity of the French and other empires.
Those who lived through these years, knew not of the War to come. War might have
been feared but it was not unescapable. To those who lived at the time it was still an age
of hope, and their heros were peacemakers such as Briand, Stresemann, Kellogg, and,
yes, Laval.

A. Childhood
Pierre Laval was born in Auvergne in the little town ofChateldon on 28 June 1883 2 •
His father, Baptiste Laval, was proprietor of the most prosperous of the seven local inns,

l'H6tel du Centre. Baptiste Laval was also the butcher and the postmaster and ran the
only coach service. 3 Through his function as innkeeper and postmaster, he could claim
equal footing with the local notables. Culturally, however, he still belonged to the world
of farmers and sharecroppers. Pierre Laval would develop great pride from his rural
ongms.

2

Gaston Jacquemin, La Vie Publique de Pierre Laval, 1883-1945 (Paris: Pion, 1973), 19.

3

"La maison de mes parents... C'est la qu'a vu le jour la premiere entreprise de transport de Chiiteldon ...
Nous avions six cheveaux, deux voitures, l'une de dimension modeste, l'autre d'un gabarit plus important"
(The house of my parents ... There, was born Chiiteldon's first transportion firm ... We had six horses, two
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Pierre had two elder brothers and a sister. One of his brothers became a railroad
employee after a passage through the seminary. The other was an army officer. His
sister married a warrant officer and established herself in Bayonne where Laval the law
student would stay with her for a time. 4
From his mother, Claudine, Pierre inherited his black hair, dark and almost slanted
eyes and fleshy lips. The whole gave him a "foreign appearance" and made him an easy
target for verbal and physical abuse from his classmates. Rather than bend, the little
Pierre resisted and learned not only to fight but also to charm his opponents. He would
befriend Joseph, son of the doctor Joseph Claussat, the Radical Socialist mayor of
Chateldon. 5
A good student, he easily completed his primary studies and at barely eleven he
obtained his Certificat d'Etudes Primaire, a success deemed largely sufficient by Baptiste
Laval. Pierre was now to help at the inn and drive the coach to Puy-Guillaume, the train
station of Ris or even to Vichy. 6 But Pierre had greater ambitions, and education was the
sole means to breech the social gap between farmer and notable. For four years Pierre
would battle his father for more education. His mother and the local priest, who helped
him with his Latin, supported him.
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The father eventually relented, and Pierre left Chateldon for the quasi-monastic life
at the lycee (high school) in Moulins. There he did well enough to be allowed to study
for the baccalaureat at the prestigious Lycee St. Louis in Paris. He secured the precious
diploma on his first try on 20 July 1901. 7 He had become an official member of France's
intellectual elite.

B. Studies and Political Engagement
Young Pierre's thirst for knowledge was not yet quenched, he pursued graduate
studies in Natural Sciences first in Bordeaux then in Bayonne. He sustained himself as a
study hall monitor (pion) in lycees, a choice which led him from town to town as posts
opened and closed. Being young, poor, "intellectual," a witness of the condition of
workers reduced to misery by age or injury in the industrial towns of St. Etienne and
Lyons, Pierre Laval naturally gravitated to the political left.
In 1903 he joined a radical branch of the Socialist Party, le comite revolutionaire
central. Laval's Socialist convictions, however, were not motivated by ideology but by
his sense of equity and justice. That same year he was conscripted into the army. Laval

Laval's grades at the baccalaureat were Composition fran~aise 14/20; langues vivantes, 10/20; explication
frarn;aise (Chateaubriand, Mme de Stael), 10/20; histoire (Frederic II) 4/10; geographie (cotes de la
Mediterranee), 3.5/10; anglais (Tales from Shakespeare, de Lamb), 11/20; espagnol (novelas de Cervantes),
2/20; sciences physiques (images formees par Jes mirroir spheriques), 11/20; mathematiques (resolutions de
triangles), 13/20. Alfred Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des annees obscures, 14. To an American eye the grades
may appear low but one has to know that save for the exact sciences a grade of20/20 was and is unheard
off, outstanding students range in the 15+. It is interesting to note that Laval's English (11/20) was
apparently not as awful as once commonly believed.
7
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did not share the admiration of many of his compatriots for the military. After all,
soldiers were often used to crush strikers, and the Dreyfus Affair, still in full swing,
showed the ugly side of the army's top echelon. 8 In addition, at the turn of the century
Pacifism and International Socialism were nearly undistinguishable. Pacifism was
perhaps the only ideology Laval would ever embrace. He would serve only one of the
mandatory two years. 9 The army discharged him because of varicose veins, possibly a
pretext for the military hierarchy to rid itself of a potentially contentious element. The
whole experience left no discernible mark. 10
In 1905, Laval obtained his natural science degree in botany, zoology and

zootechnique. This degree could have brought him the security of a post of professor.

8
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Perhaps because he had spent too much time within school walls, he opted to study law in
Lyon.
The law student bore a moustache; it would remain part of his persona for the rest
of his life. He also took to wearing a red tie as a mark of his political affiliation. In 1908
he passed the bar. 11

C. Jeanne

Still poor but now respectable, Laval returned more often to his hometown of
Chateldon. He often visited his friend Joseph Claussat, also a Socialist, who had
followed his father's footsteps into the mayor's seat. The visits to Joseph were spiced by
the presence of his sister, Jeanne-Eugenie Elisabeth Claussat, a voluptuous beauty. Her
charms were only enhanced by political savvy and superior management skills, which are
said to be inborn among Auvergnats. Moreover she was even a great cook. 12 Pierre and
Jeanne fell in love and were married on 20 October 1909. From all accounts they would
remain happily faithful to each other for the rest of their lives. 13
Laval's law degree brought him respectability. With this marriage Laval had also·
entered the world of distinguished gentlemen. At least in Chateldon where a man was
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more important than his political color, being a Socialist, did not diminish one's
respectability, but, to mark his change in social status, Laval took to wearing what would
be one of his trademarks, a white tie.
Fortune did not follow, at least not right away. He opened an office on the first
floor of a humble building he shared with a "dentist," a cobbler, a tripe butcher, and a
prostitute. His fees were paltry, two francs per visit. His neighbor pulled teeth for
three. 14 While Laval persevered, Jeanne made do with the limited resources. His
Socialist ties and bargain prices gained him humble but grateful clients. Small
entrepreneurs, furniture movers, coach and taxi drivers, and manual laborers were the
core of his patrons.

D. Bakunin's Portrait
In 1911 the CGT, the Socialist labor union, asked Laval to defend one of its
members, an anarchist who had been caught with explosives. The case for the defense
seemed hopeless and no CGT lawyer wanted the case. Laval decided to take it pro bono.
The prosecution made much of a portrait of Bakunin, famed Russian anarchist, found in
possession of the accused. 15 Laval masterfully down played the accusations and
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annihilated the prosecution's case by proving that the alleged portrait of Bakunin was in
fact that of the accused's father. 16 Overnight Laval gained fame and fortune. The grateful
unionists raised 50,000 francs as an expression of their gratitude. His brother-in-law
Joseph Claussat, a deputy himself, encouraged him to take advantage of his new found
fame and run for office. Laval entered the race for the seat of deputy of NeuillyBoulogne-Billancourt. Even though he was defeated, he fared well for a newcomer. His
courtroom triumph gained him a wealthier clientele, but he refused to forsake his
prev10us one.

E. Bonds
One of Laval's attractive traits was his loyalty to his friends. It crossed social and
political barriers, and was returned in kind. Ties once established were longstanding: the
furniture movers, he had aided in the lean years, provided his security service when he
campaigned under the Socialist label. The movers remained true to Laval even after his
defection from the Socialist Party.
In 1911, Laval's life was enriched by the birth of his only child, Josee Laval (19111992). The father and the daughter would develop an intimate bond, and she would play
a pivotal role in his life, private and even political.
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F. Depute Socialiste de La Seine
In the spring of 1914, as fear of war swept the nation, in April the Socialists and the
Radicals geared up their electoral campaign in defense of peace. Their leaders were Jean
Jaures and Joseph Caillaux. 17 The Bloc des Gauches denounced the law passed in July
1913 extending the compulsory military service from two to three years. The CGT
sought Pierre Laval as Socialist candidate for the district of the Seine, a Parisian suburb
both rural and industrial. He was victorious. The Radicals, with the support of the
Socialists, held the majority in the chamber. Together they hoped to avert war. The
assassinations of Archduke Francis Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 and Jaures on 31 July
1914 shattered the hopes of the pacifists.
Pierre Laval and some 2,000 others were listed by the military in the infamous
carnet B, a compilation of the potentially subversive elements who might hinder or

17
Caillaux, Joseph Pierre Marie Auguste (1863-1944), was both a brilliant politician and a lunatic. He
fathered the income tax. He had foreseen the devastating effects of World War. His greatest failure was
arrogance, so convinced he was of his own greatness that he would only accept the company of people who
would agree with him. Opposition caused him intense mental distress. In 1914, when the Figaro attacked
him and published his private letters, he became so aggravated that his wife, Henriette, in order to put an
end to the paper's campaign, shot and killed Gaston Calmette the editor of the Figaro! The court was
sympathetic to the wife, defender of the husband's honor, and found her not guilty! Furthermore, Caillaux's
taste for sensationalism caused him to make statements that were at best irrelevant but often incendiary.
While the French government was attempting to bring Italy into the war against Germany, Caillaux let it be
heard that England was about to withdraw on the assurance of German evacuation of Belgium. It was also
discovered that Caillaux's contacts had accepted money from Germany. For all this Clemenceau had him
tried. Although the case against Caillaux was weak, he was nonetheless condemned to time served -- two
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oppose the mobilization. 18 In name of national unity, Minister of the Interior Jean-Louis
Malvy, despite pressure from the chiefs of staff, refused to have anyone apprehended. 19
During the war Laval remained a pacifist, a dangerous position when any
consideration of dialogue with the enemy was considered a crime. Unlike Socialists such
as Pierre Renaudel of L'Humanite or Leon Jouhaux of the CGT, Laval remained true to
his pacifist's convictions. 20 He quietly chose to direct his efforts toward the material
wellfare of the French. In December 1915, Jean Longuet, grandson of Karl Marx,
proposed to the Socialist parliamentarians that they open communications with the
Socialists of other states. Longuet hoped to pressure the belligerent govermnents into a
negotiated peace. Laval signed on, but the motion was defeated. 21
With all of France's resources geared for war, basic goods were often scarce or
overpriced. Laval first concerned himself essentially with the well being of his
constituency. Eventually he would extend his efforts to the Parisian and national scene.
He was seen visiting slaughter houses with Minister Malvy. On 30 January 1917, in the
national assembly he called upon Supply Minister Edouard Herriot to deal with the
18
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inadequate coal supply in Paris. Author Alfred Mallet wrote: "Herriot whimpered 'If I
could, I would unload the barges myself ... "' Laval retorted "Do not add ridicule to
ineptitude. "22 The words delighted the assembly and attracted the attention of George
Clemenceau. The relationship between Laval and Herriot, however, would always be
strained.

G. Stockholm, etoile polaire
As the bloody stalemate of the war only grew worse, Laval scorned the conduct of
the war and the poor supply of the troops in the field. When mutinies broke out after
General Robert Nivelle's disastrous offensive of April 1917 at Chemin des Dames, he
spoke in defense of the mutineers. When Marcel Cachin and Marius Moutet returned
from St. Petersburg in June 1917 with the invitation to a convention of the international
socialism in Stockholm, Laval saw a chance for peace. In a lyrical address to the
assembly, reported here by author Mallet, he urged the chamber to allow a delegation to
go: "Yes, Stockholm, in response to the call of the Russian Revolution... Yes,
Stockholm, for peace . . . Yes, Stockholm the polar star. "23 The request was denied. The
Alexandre Ribot government was overthrown. Paul Prudent Painleve formed a new

22

"Herriot gem it: 'Si je pouvais, j'irais decharger moi-meme Jes peniches.' La voix rauque du jeune depute
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"Oui, Stockholm, a l'appel de la revolution Russe... Oui, Stockholm pour la paix... Oui, Stockholm
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government that did not last long. The wind of peace, which for a brief moment blew in
the spring of 1917, was overwhelmed by the discovery of a flurry of traitors, some real,
some imagined, as with Malvy -- Because he had refused to arrest the Frenchmen on the

carnet B, Malvy now became a suspect. 24 At this stage of the war, a traitor was anyone
who did not believe in the victory or who wished for peace. Laval's "Stockholm, etoile
polaire" speech had not been forgotten. Many of Laval's acquaintances, the publishers of
the anarchist Bonnet rouge (Red hat), and other pacifists were arrested or interrogated.
Though Laval frequented pacifist circles -- it was said that he was acquainted with Leon
Trotsky -- the authorities did not pursue him. 25 His seat of deputy, his overall caution,
and his many friendships across the political spectrum protected him. In November 1917,
Clemenceau even offered him a post in government, but the Socialist Party by then
refused to enter any government. Laval toed to the party line, but he questioned the
wisdom of such a policy in a meeting of the Socialist members of parliament. 26

24
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The war ended, a pyrrhic victory for the whole of France. The north of the country
was ravaged. Every town, every village, every family was affected by death or
mutilation. Laval's brother, Jean, the army officer, died in the first months of the war.

H. Party Member?
Nineteen nineteen was an election year. A conservative tidal wave, the Bloc
National, swept the National Assembly. Despite a dynamic campaign, Pierre Laval was

not reelected. The Socialists record of pacifism, their opposition to the immensely
popular Clemenceau, and the anxiety arising from the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia; all
contributed to the defeat of the Socialists. 27
Throughout France as in much of the rest of Europe, social unrest followed the
conservative victories. The CGT, with a strength of2,400,000 members, launched a
general strike in 1920. The CGT's offensive petered out, however, as thousands of
workers were laid off. The government sought to dissolve the CGT. Laval, with Joseph
Paul-Boncour as chief counsel, assumed the defense of the union leaders. 28 While they
failed in the courtroom, Laval saved the CGT by appealing directly to the ministers of the
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interior and of commerce and industry, Theodore Steeg and Auguste Isaac. The CGT
survived. 29
While his interest in improvingthe lot of the workers never faltered, his relation
with the Socialist Party drew to an end. The last few years spent with the Socialist
caucus in the chamber combined with the party discipline eroded Laval's attachment to
the Socialist cause. With the Bolshevik victory in Russia the party itself was changing,
the congress of Tours in December of 1920 saw the schism of the Socialists into two
ideologically competing components: the Communist Party (PCF), which derived its
inspiration directly from Moscow, and the more moderate SFIO, Section Franyaise de
l'Intemationale Ouvriere. Laval simply let his membership fall by the wayside, not taking
sides as the two factions battled over the legacy of Jean Jaures. 30 Ideology would never
hold Laval's attention. When, during the dark years of the occupation a variety of "right
wing" doctrines came forth, which he would also ignore. 31
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I. The Notable
Laval's financial success, possibly affected his decision to leave the Socialists.
Possibly he preferred not to tackle the incongruity of being well to do and a card-carrying
member of the SFIO or the PCF. He might also have simply been unwilling to waste his
energy in ideological jousts. When probed about his defection, Laval declared that the
party had changed at Tours, not him. 32 In truth, Laval was too much of an individualist to
belong to any party. He would run for the first time as an independant in the 1923
mayoral election in Aubervilliers. He sought to become a well-respected notable like the
Claussats in Chateldon. He believed that "a sound material independence, if not
essential, gives to government officials who have it a greater political independence." 33
His aspirations were attained with a new residence, 15 Villa Said, near the elegant
Avenue Foch, first as tenant and then in 1925 as an owner. In 1923 he also bought Le
Domaine de la Corbiere, a small farm in Normandy, making him a neighbor of Aristide
Briand. 34 Always a farmer at heart, he managed the property himself and bought and sold
his own cattle and horses. Laval was finally able to put his degree in Natural Sciences to
good use.
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A successful political career needs the support of the press. With this in mind,
Laval acquired the newspaper the Moniteur du Puy-de-Dome and the printing works
Mont Louis in 1927. In 1931 he bought Radio-Lyon and the Lyon Republicain. He
would resell the Lyon Republicain to his friend, the young deputy Raymond Patenotre. 35
The acquisition of the Chateau de Chateldon was a symbol of his ascension. The castle
also possessed three springs he would secure a few years later. Laval would bottle the
water of the most productive spring, La Sargentale. Though La Sargentale's ouput was
never great, it was Laval's joy to see it served on board the trains of the Compagnie
Internationale des Wagons-Lits. He managed his enterprises closely and placed his
friends in the key posts. Some, like La Sargentale, barely eked out a profit, but the
printing house, the paper and the radio did very well. Much had been made of the Laval
"fortune," especially at the 1945 trial. But even Laval's stubborn enemies had to concede
that Lava_l attained it honestly. Laval was able to accumulate wealth in part because he
lived frugally, entertained little, and invested conservatively in stable capital, never
putting his trust in stocks or banking his income.36
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J. Maire d'Aubervilliers

In 1923 the city of Aubervilliers, in the northern suburb of Paris, needed a new
mayor. As a former deputy of the circonscription (constituency), Laval was an obvious
candidate for the post. To be eligible for election in that particular district, Laval
purchased a piece of farmland "Les Bergeries. "37 Because Laval's defection from the
Socialists was done with little fanfare, few were aware of it. Laval was asked in turn by
the local SFIO and the Communist Party to head their respective lists. 38 Laval, instead,
chose to run under the Laval list, composed of former Socialists he convinced to leave the
party and work for him. This was an independent Socialist Party of sorts that only
existed in Aubervilliers. In a four-way race Laval was victorious in the second round. 39
By nature Laval abhorred conflict and he promptly won over through personal
contacts those he defeated. He developed a network among the humble and the well to
do in Aubervilliers, not to mention the mayors of the neighboring towns. He was the
only independent politician in the northern suburb of Paris known after the 1924 elections
as the Ban/ieu Rouge (Red Suburb). This peculiarity allowed him to avoid getting
immersed in the ideological war raging between Socialists and communists. Laval
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simply built friendships and earned the confidence of the voters by intelligently managing
the town's assets. 40

K. Depute Independant de La Seine
If the SFIO resented Laval's withdrawal from the party, it was discreet about it. The

Socialists needed Laval for the 1924 legislative elections. The Socialist Party in
combination with the Radicals formed a national coalition known as the Cartel des
Gauches. Laval headed a list of independent Socialists in the Seine. The Cartel was
victorious and Laval who regained a seat of deputy for the national assembly. Leftist
euphoria swept France. The first action of Laval as deputy was to bring back Joseph
Caillaux, former member of the national assembly and once the shining star of the
Radical Party. 41 Clemenceau had had Caillaux arrested toward the end of the War for
collusion with the enemy. He had served two years in prison and had lost his civic rights.
Laval took a stand for Caillaux's pardon. Laval, with others, was successful. In Caillaux,
Laval gained an influential patron.
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L. Ministre and Senateur
Laval's reward for his support of the Cartel was his appointment as Minister of
Public Works in the government of Paul Painleve in April 1925. Six months later in pure
Third Republic style, the government collapsed. 42 Nevertheless, from then on Laval
belonged to the exclusive club of former ministers from which new ministers were
usually drawn. 43 Between 1925 and 1926 Laval participated three more times in Briand
governments, once as under-secretary to the premier and twice as minister of Justice
(garde des sceaux). When he first became minister of justice, Laval abandoned his law
practice to avoid any conflict of interest. This was a sacrifice well worth making, as the
ministry of justice was the gateway to the prime ministry. 44
Laval's momentum was frozen after 1926 through a reshuffling of the cartel
majority orchestrated by the Radical-Socialist mayor and deputy of Lyon, Edouard
Herriot. 45 Founded in 1901 the Radical Party became the hinge faction of the Third
Republic. 46 Its support or defection, as Laval would experience, often meant the survival
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or collapse of governments. Through this latest mood swing in the national assembly,
Laval was excluded from the direction of France for four years. Author Gaston
Jacquemin suggested that Laval deliberately chose not to partake in a Herriot
government, which he judged incapable of handling the financial crisis. 47 The year 1926
marked the definitive break between Laval and the left. 48 If Laval was attacked in the
leftist press for his departure, he nonetheless maintained his friends on the left.
In 1927 Laval won the seat of the Senator of the Seine, in effect withdrawing from
and placing himself above the political battles for ephemeral majorities in the National
Assembly. 49 He longed for a constitutional reform that would strengthen the executive
branch and eliminate the political instability, the grievous flaw of the Third Republic. 50
On 2 March 1930 Laval returned to government as Minister of Labor in the second
Andre Tardieu government. Tardieu and Laval knew each other from the days of
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Clemenceau, which developed into mutual appreciation. 51 Tardieu needed men he could
trust: his previous government collapsed a little over a week earlier because of the
defection of the minister of Labor, Louis Loucheur. But, when the radical Socialist
Camille Chautemps failed to form a viable government, Tardieu was called back. 52
At the time the social climate was tense. More than 150,000 textile workers were
on strike, and violence was feared. As minister of public works in 1925, Laval had ended
the strike of the mine workers. Tardieu hoped he could do the same as minister oflabor.
Tardieu's faith was justified: The conflict was settled without bloodshed. 53 Even
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Socialist politician Leon Blum, never one of Laval's allies, conceded that Laval's
"intervention was skillful, opportune and decisive. "54
Laval's greatest achievement in the Tardieu government was yet to come. Social
insurance (Assurances Socia/es) had been on the agenda of the legislative assembly for
over ten years. It had even passed the Chamber of Deputies but not the Senate in 1928. 55
Tardieu gave Laval the deadline of May first to get the project through. The date was
chosen to stifle the usual agitation of labor day. 56 Laval's first effort went into clarifying
the muddled collection of texts. He then consulted the employer and labor organizations.
In two months Laval was able to present to the assembly a text which overcame the
difficulties which had caused its original failure. It met the financial constraints, reduced
the control of the government, and preserved the free choice of doctors and their billing
freedom. The chamber and the senate passed the new law with an overwhelming
majority. Another Tardieu achievement was the establishment of free High School
education. The successes of the Tardieu government, however, did not resist the
ramifications of the Oustric affair. After the failure of the Oustric Bank, it appeared that
members of the Tardieu government had improper ties to the financial institution. The
scandal involved Minister of Justice Raoul Peret, and Under-Secretaries Henri Falcoz and
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Eugene Lautier. Though Tardieu was not involved in the wrongdoing of his ministers,
on 4 December 1930, Tardieu lost his majority in the Senate. 57
President of the Republic Gaston Doumergue called upon Louis Barthou to form a
government, but Barthou failed. 58 Doumergue turned to Laval, who fared no better. 59
The disappointment was short-lived, however, as the following month the government
formed by Theodore Steeg floundered. Doumergue renewed his offer to Laval. On 27
January 1931 he successfully formed his first government. 60
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M. The Laval Government
In the words of Leon Blum, the Socialist opposition was amazed and disappointed
that the ghost ofTardieu's government reappeared within a few weeks of being defeated
with Laval, "like a night bird surprised by the light" at its head. 61 Laval's nomination as
premier led to the speculation that Tardieu, the new Agriculture minister, held the real
power in the Laval Government. 62 Indisputably Laval thought highly ofTardieu, as well
as of Briand, and applied policies in line with theirs. 63 Laval, however, had his own style
and certainly had not made it that far to become Tardieu's mouthpiece.
While it was true that the ministers who formed the Laval government were in
great part the same who had formed Tardieu governments in the past, it was, however,
more a function of the composite majority Laval could find at the National Assembly
than anything else. 64 Laval -- like Raymond Poincare, Briand and Tardieu before him -had offered ministerial posts to Herriot's Radicals, but to no avail. 65
61
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Although it had chosen not to be represented in the government, the support of the
inescapable party of Herriot, was still necessary. Laval's ace-in-the-hole was his network
of friends and supporters in the chamber, the "Lavalists." Laval like Tardieu did not
always see eye to eye with the deputy of Lyon. While the sometimes abrasive Tardieu
was often in conflict with Herriot, Laval would attempt the delicate task of conciliating
the two. 66
Besides the so called unmovables (inamovibles) -- Briand, Maginot, PierreEtienne Flandin, Paul Reynaud -- Laval brought in his own team of advisors, such old
friends as Maurice Foulon, the collaborator from Aubervilliers, and Pierre Cathala, whom
he knew from his days in Bayonne and who had worked in Laval's Labor ministry.
Cathala began as under-secretary of the interior and would become minister of the interior
in January 1932. 67 Blaise Diagne of Senegal, the first African deputy, had joined the
National Assembly at the same time as Laval in 1914. Diagne achieved another first
when Laval invited him to join his cabinet as under-secretary to the colonies, making him
the first Black African in a French government. Laval also called on financial experts
such as Jacques Rueff, Charles Rist and Adeodat Boissard to tackle the arduous financial
puzzles of the time. Germanist, Andre Fran9ois-Poncet, was brought to the forefront first
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as under-secretary to the premier and then as ambassador to Germany. 68 Laval's
government even included an economist, Claude-Joseph Gignoux, at a time when
economists in government services were rare. 69 The presence of economists could be
taken as an indication that Laval was concerned about the condition of France's economy.

N. France's Economy in 1931
Indeed France, in 1931, could still pretend to be unaffected by the crisis that had
brought the world to its knees. 70 Premier Laval declared upon embarking for America on
16 October 1931, "France remained healthy thanks to work and savings. "71 Agriculture,
small industry, and protectionism were the bases of France's economy. The conservative
policy, some would say the "archaic" system of contained wages and limited social
services, had allowed France to accumulate the largest gold reserves in the world after the
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United States. 72 France still reaped the benefits of the devaluation of the franc
orchestrated by Poincare, which made French products such as automobiles very
competitive on the world market. Unemployment was at least officially virtually
nonexistent with only 12,000 jobless for the whole of France. 73 Official low
unemployment numbers meant no benefits for the unemployed were necessary which
translated into substantial budgetary savings, further perpetuating the image of a healthy
economy. While France's good fortune was perhaps exaggerated, its economic situation
was far better than that of other nations.
Laval and his cabinet considered the good economy and the substantial gold
reserves, as means to diplomatic ends. In this rich nation's game it was essential that
assistance should be received with gratitude and not scorn. With this master card in hand
Laval left France for the first time to visit London, Berlin and Washington. He attended
various conferences and focussed on several of the interlinked problems of the world
economic crisis, war reparations and debts, disarmament, and the gold standard.
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CHAPTER
II

A TAINTED PEACE

In this chapter we focus not so much on Laval but on the political and diplomatic
situation that Laval had to contend with in 1931. At the heart of all international
problems of the early thirties laid the Versailles treaty. It exerted its deleterious influence
on most post-war administrations world-wide, Laval's government included. Many of
France's problems internationally and therefore domestically derived from the treaty.

A. The Versailles Treaty
The Versailles Treaty was but one of five treaties generated from the Paris Peace
Conference. The Treaties of St. Germain-en-Laye (September 1919), Neuilly (November
1919), Trianon (June 1920) and Sevres (August 1920) ended the war respectively with
Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire. Sevres would have to be
renegotiated because of the advent of Mustapha Kemal (Ataturk) and the birth of the
Turkish state.
The Treaty of Versailles, however, signed on 28 June 1919, loomed far above the
other treaties, for it officially "settled" the conflict between France, her allies, and
Germany, and set the tone for the other treaties. The months, after the hostilities ceased,
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were sheer chaos: inadequate accommodations for the delegates in Paris, the
embarrassing exposure of secret treaties, the collapse of empires, births of nations,
horrors of famine, and deadly influenza. As if this were not enough, the big egos of the
principals collided; they worked without agenda nor direction. These principals were:
British Prime Minister David Lloyd George and his Foreign Secretary Arthur James
Balfour, French Premier Georges Clemenceau and Delegate Andre Tardieu, Italian
Premier Vittorio Orlando and his Foreign Minister Sydney Sonnino, American President
Woodrow T. Wilson and his confidant Edward M. House. Paul H. Hymans of Belgium
and Eleutherios Venizelos of Greece commanded a presence in the negotiations by the
sheer strength of their personalities. 74 In addition to these delegates were the envoys of
all the other nations involved in the conflict except the defeated powers, and Russia.
Every aspects of the Treaty not dealt specifically by the principals were farmed out to
committees who unfortunately did not confer among each other.
Eventually on 7 May 1919 after nearly six months of preparations the allies
presented the German delegates with a treaty of 440 clauses. Because the allies did not
want to spend any more time on the treaty than they already had, they did not give the
German delegation the opportunity to negotiate. 75 Germany's non-participation was the
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first major problem of the Versailles treaty, which would be denounced at nauseam as the

diktat, by German nationalists.
Germany had lost the war and as a consequence, the Versailles treaty stripped
Germany of all its colonies witch were ceded under allied mandates. 76 In Europe
Germany lost territories as well. In the West, the Alsace and the Lorraine which had been
seized during the Franco-Prussian War (1870) were returned to France. France also
received a fifteen-year mandate on the coal rich Saar region. Belgium gained the frontier
districts ofMoresnet, Eupen, and Malmedy. To protect the West from a new German
threat the left bank, and a band fifty kilometers wide on the right bank of the Rhine was
to be demilitarized. In the North, a plebiscite -- first promised by Otto von Bismarck in
1866 -- returned part of the Schleswig to Denmark. Heligoland remained German but
had to be demilitarized. The East saw the most change. The Poles used the war to
resurrect their nation and the Polish Republic was in place by the time the armistice was
declared on 11November1918.77 One of the principal aspirations of the new republic,
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however, was access to the sea, and only the allied powers could achieve this.
Clemenceau was very much in favor of expanding Poland to the Baltic, but Lloyd George
despised anything Polish and wished to keep the new state as small as possible. Wilson
favored the Polish claim but he was also determined not to dismember Germany. The
compromised result was the creation of the Polish corridor leading from Poland proper to
the free city/harbor of Danzig. This absurd solution cut East Prussia from the rest of
Germany and left Poland with a potential aggressor on two fronts. To allay Polish and
French fears, the German army was drastically reduced and barred from possessing tanks,
airplanes and other modern articles of war. The English were content with stripping the
German navy of most of its capital ships and prohibiting the construction and use of
submarines.
In 1870 Prussia-Germany had exacted heavy indemnities and occupation costs
from France and it seemed only natural to demand the same from defeated Germany.
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President Wilson was agreeable to reparations to restore the damage done to the allied
powers, but he vehemently opposed indemnities to reimburse the war costs endured by
the allies. 78 Setting the amount of the reparations then was not feasible, in part because
Wilson wanted to verify the damage claims of the allies. 79 The failure to set an amount
for the reparations would poison international relations for the years to come, as Germany
denounced the blank check.
One article pertaining to the reparations had an impact out of proportion with its
intended scope. Article 231 of the Treaty read:
The Allied and Associated Governments affirm, and Germany accepts, the
responsibility of Germany and her Allies for causing all the loss and
damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their
nationals have been subjected as a consequence of a war imposed upon
them by the aggression of Germany and her Allies.

This article, which would incidently also appear in the treaties with Austria and Hungary,
would be denounced, with great ability, by Germany as the infamous war guilt clause. In
his memoirs Jacques Benoist-Mechin related that German children learned, like a prayer,
a speech by President Paul von Hindenburg given on 18 September 1927:
... We reject, and the German people unanimously with us, the accusation
that Germany was responsible for initiating the greatest of all wars.
Neither envy, nor hate, nor thirst of conquest armed us. The war was only
the supreme means, at the cost of immense sacrifices, to face a world of
enemies. It is with a pure heart that we defended our fatherland; it is with

78

Marks, The Jllusion of Peace, 12-13.

79

Ibid., 14.

32

pure hands that the German army handled the sword . . . Germany is
ready, at all times, to prove it to impartial judges ... 80
All in all the treaty of Versailles was not as harsh as it could have been. Many
Frenchmen had looked with favor upon the outbreak of the Bavarian revolution
(7-9 November 1918) seeking independence from Germany; these same Frenchmen
would have been delighted to see the German Empire, which had been proclaimed at
Versailles on January 1871, be undone there as well. Clemenceau, however, accepted to
curb the more exacting demands in exchange of the promise of an Anglo-American
security agreement, which never became a reality.
The loftiest accomplishment of the treaty of Versailles was the Covenant of the
League of Nations. President Wilson's brain child, the League was designed to offer a
forum to the world nations in which they could solve international problems. The
members of the league agreed to engage in diplomatic talks for three months before
resorting to war. The Covenant also called for the creation of the Permanent Court of
International Justice which went into effect in 1921 and came to siege in The Hague.
However, as discussed below, the League of Nations was in for a difficult birth.
To be effective, the Treaty of Versailles relied on the cooperation of the chief
victors: The United States, Great Britain and France. It also trusted in the cooperation of
defeated Germany. Many Germans, however, apparently did not feel honor bound by
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what they called the Diktat. As to the Allies the cooperation that had prevailed during the
war and during the peace talks was soon put to the test. 81

B. The United States and the Versailles Treaty
In 1919-1920 American President Woodrow Wilson faced an isolationist
movement at home. Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, Republican chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, led the opposition. The senator had the support of
western colleagues such as William E. Borah of Idaho. Borah, with perhaps less talent
but with equal effect, would perpetuate Lodge's isolationist sway on American world
politics into the 1930s. 82
Hostility to the treaty in the United States focussed on the clause calling for the
creation of the League of Nations. This section was particularly dear to the "apostle of
peace," President Wilson, while it conjured images of entangling alliances among Lodge
and his supporters. Unwilling to compromise, the president attempted to appeal directly
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to the people. Unfortunately, a heart attack followed by a long and agonizing recovery
prevented the President from effectively challenging Senator Lodge, and the United
States Senate never ratified the treaty.

C. Great Britain and France in relation to Germany
In the post-war years Great Britain, more than any other major power, showed a
rare willingness to put the war behind her. In 1922 the British foreign office sent out the
"Balfour Note." Foreign Secretary Balfour stated in the note Great Britain's willingness
to forego all debt payment and reparations, but since the United States was not ready to
do the same, Great Britain simply requested that the allies and Germany pay enough to
cover the American loan. The British lent one and a half billion pounds ( ::::$7.3 billion)
excluding interest and owed 4.3 billion dollars ( ::::£878 million) to the United States.
However generous, this plan did not appeal to the French for they wanted Germany's
reparations to cover all the foreign debt, which was not acceptable for the British or for
that matter Germany.
The difficulties raised by the French in combination with the demands of an
anemic economy led the British to talk about canceling the reparations all together. The
British thought that by lifting the reparation burden, the German economy would revive
and open up to British goods and services. An additional benefit was to reestablish the
disrupted balance of power on the continent which the British believed to be too much in
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France's favor. Canceling the reparations unilaterally, however, was economically not
viable and as long as reparations were to be paid, the English would fight for their share. 83
The fact that the British even mentioned canceling the reparations, simply horrified the
French haunted as they were by the Teutonic threat.
As to the continental balance of power, Britain wrongly assessed France's
intentions; European adventures reminiscent of those of Napoleon I and Napoleon III
were of the past. The Great War had cost France much of its youth and dynamism. Only
Serbia and Rumania had suffered a greater percentage of dead and missing. 84 France
aspired for peace and security; it could no longer think of conquest. Construction from
1927 to 1936 of the purely defensive Maginot Line best illustrated France's hunger for
security, and her dread of Germany. 85
Had France supported Great Britain's suggestion to cancel reparations and even
abrogate Versailles, it could be argued that Germany would not have generated Hitler for
lack of a political platform from which to grab power. Nevertheless, abandoning
Versailles was unthinkable to most Frenchmen; too many had died for it, and only strong
military guarantees from the British or the Americans, preferably both, might have
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suaded the French. Without the support of their former allies, the French did not want to
take the risk of trusting the Germans. France's survival, so thought many Frenchmen,
could not allow a revitalized Germany. 86 This intransigence was, however, impossible
for all Frenchmen to maintain, and efforts were eventually made to reconcile the two
peoples.
The first of such efforts resulted in the Pact ofLocamo in 1925. By this pact
Germany, represented by Chancellor Hans Luther and German Foreign Secretary Gustav
Stresemann, recognized Germany's present western borders with France and Belgium and
promised not to resort to war to change them. Germany also accepted demilitarized
status of the Rhineland. Great Britain, in the person of British Foreign Secretary Austen
Chamberlain, and Italy, in the person of Benito Mussolini, pledged to declare war upon
the violator of the pact whether he be French or German. A direct consequence of the
Pact was the evacuation of the Ruhr -- which had been occupied by the French and the
Belgians because of Germany's failure to pay the reparations -- and the admission of
Germany to the League of Nations. At Locamo, for the first time since the war, the
former enemies had met and dealt with each others as equals. Through the pact Briand
was able to mend the diplomatic damage done to France's image abroad by the

86

Geoffrey Warner pointed out the absurdity of the Franco German rapport de force. Versailles
perpetuated a situation in which a militarily stronger France kept in check a demographically and
economically superior Germany. Warner, Pierre Laval and the Eclipse of France, 26.

37

occupation of the Ruhr. For his efforts Chamberlain was awarded the 1925 Nobel Peace
Prize. Stresemann and Briand received the prize jointly in 1926.

D. The implications of a link between
war reparations and war debts in Franco-American relations
During the war France had lent fourteen billion francs (:::::$2.7 billion) to her allies,
more than seven billion of it to a Russian government which no longer existed. France
had also been a borrower, £450,000 ( :::::$2.2 billion) from Great Britain, and roughly $3.5
billion dollars from the Americans, two thirds during the conflict and a third afterwards to
sustain the economy. 87 Though President Wilson had insisted that the German
reparations were intended solely for the restoration of the lands and industries devastated
by the war, it was France's intention -- as well as that of Great Britain, Belgium, and Italy
-- to use the funds to reimburse the lenders. 88 Versailles had established the principles of
reparations, the Conference of Spa (5-16 July 1920) allocated each nation's share of the
reparations: France was to receive 52 percent, the British Empire 22 percent, Italy 10
percent, and Belgium 8 percent. The remainder was to be divided among the other allied
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powers. The amount of the reparations and the mode of payment was yet to be
determined. 89
The French, probably more so than the other nations, viewed intergovernmental
loans as a tool of diplomacy. When it became apparent that the Americans were not
eager to join in a security pact, the French thought to tie French and American interest. It
thus became essential to link the debt owed America to the German reparations due
France. The declared reason was that if Germany ceased payments, France wanted to be
able to do the same vis-a-vis the United States, but the concealed intent of an American
recognition of the link between reparation and debt was to bond France and America in a
common purpose against Germany. It was an indirect way for the French to force the
Americans to fulfill Wilson's promises at Versailles despite the United States Senate.
Versailles, rightly or not, was seen by the French as the only warrant for peace and
security. For the same reasons, ignoring the potential link between debt and reparations
was essential for the isolationists in the American Senate.
More practically, as author Alfred Mallet suggested, the Americans were not
averse to the cancellation of the German public debt, which amounted to the reparations
to the allies. Cancellation would alleviate the German people's tax burden and insure the
repayment of the private loans extended by the Americans. 90 Indeed from the armistice
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until 1929, and even beyond, American investors had made many, potentially bad loans
to Germany.
Herbert Hoover, secretary of commerce from 1920 to 1928, had initially
encouraged these loans in 1924 through the Dawes plan -- named for General Charles G.
Dawes, engineer, attorney, financier, statesman and in this instance chairman of the
Allied Reparation Committee. 91 The Dawes plan set the annual payment for Germany to
the allies at one billion gold Reichsmarks (::::£50 million or ::::$240 million) to be
progressively raised to 2.5 billion Reichsmarks ( ::::£1.25 billion or ::::$6 billion) on the fifth
year and the years after that. No mention of a final date was set. The national German
railroads in chaos since the end of the war were reorganized under the Dawes plan and
formed into the Deutsche Reichseisenbahngesellschaft with a capital of fourteen billion
gold marks. The new railroad company was to pay an annuity of 660 million gold marks
to the Reparation Commission. The Commission was also to receive the interest from the
mortgage of five billion marks imposed on the German industry at the end of the War. 92
The Dawes plan called for an 800 million Reichsmarks (::::£40 million or ::::$200 million)
loan to back the newly created Reichsmark and help Germany meet its first annuity. 93
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Hoover and President Calvin Coolidge praised Dawes's effort and encouraged the
financing of the German recovery. 94 American investors responded enthusiastically by
taking up half the loan, British participation amounted to a quarter. Hoover had not
expected such a response from American investors and now feared that his fellow citizens
had overreached themselves. Hoover's concern rose when the use of the loans became
apparent. Many German municipalities used American short-term credits to finance
long-term public projects such as "soccer stadia, swimming pools complete with artificial
wave-making apparatus, and blocks of workers' housing containing the unheard-of
extravagance of private bathrooms in each family unit. "95
Private American yearly foreign lending increased from $969 million in 1924 to
$1.25 billion in 1928. The total for those four years alone was $5.7 billion. 96 As a point
ofreference the United States national income in 1924 was estimated at $72.1 billion and
$81.7 billion in 1928.97 A concerned Hoover attempted to curb the outflow of American
money. Bankers and businessmen, however, did not welcome the commerce secretary's
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initiative. 98 They found an ally in Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon, the steel
magnate from Pittsburgh, who argued that Americans wanted to invest in Germany and
nothing was to get in the way of free enterprise. All Hoover could do without upsetting
the business world was to disengage his government of responsibility in this matter.
Germany's economic ties were not limited to loans. The United States was
Germany's most important trading partner, with Great Britain a close second. The
likelihood of an American intervention, whether political or military, against Germany
became unthinkable. 99 This only added to the French frustration and resentment at the
American failure to ratify Versailles.
The thought of abolishing the German reparations altogether received support
among many Americans, however, the cancellation of the allied war debts did not. The
French and British argument, that the blood of their soldiers was worth as much if not
more than all the American gold borrowed during the war, was not widely accepted in the
United States. Calvin Coolidge, in office from 1923 to 1929, was of the same view. The
president reflected the opinion of the great part of the American public by flatly
remarking: "They hired the money, didn't they?" 100 In 1926, in an agreement between
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Andrew Mellon and Henry Beranger of the Paul Painleve government, France agreed to
pay its debt in sixty-one annuities totaling, with interest, 6.8 billion dollars. 101 Britain had
come to a similar agreement with the United States in 1922 and paid her first annuity in
1923. 102
If the Americans refused to cancel the debt, they felt they did prove their good
will by asking very low interest rates. 103 To the touchy Europeans any interest was
outrageous. In reference to the perceived American greed, British and French renamed
Uncle Sam, "Uncle Shylock." 104

E. The German economy and the reparations.
Germany had made its first reparation payment of one billion gold marks on
1 September 1921. 105 With the economic crisis developing it became apparent that
Germany would not be able to come up with her second payment in 1922 and had already
begun defaulting on her deliveries in kind (lumber, coal, etc.). On 11 January 1923, to
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force the transfers of raw materials, France, Belgium, and Italy sent technicians -protected by French and Belgian troops -- into the Ruhr to collect the urgently needed
coal. 106 In retaliation the German workers, financially supported by their government,
went on strike, the German heavy industry stopped production.
The events in the Ruhr sent the already high inflation out of control; by
September, Gustav Stresemann, who had become chancellor in August 1923, had to call
off the strike. Germany had brought on the disaster upon itself by first financing the War,
the reparations and the Ruhr strike through inflation, but because of the occupation,
Germany was seen as the victim of French vindictiveness. 107
Moved by the struggle of the German underdog, the United States government
encouraged a plan to aid Germany and to resolve the dual problem of debt and reparation.
On 14 January 1924, the Dawes Committee began its meetings in Paris. It was to
propose to stabilize the currency and balance the budget. On 9 April 1924 the plan was
made public, it made possible the financing of the German recovery with the creation of
the Reichsmark distributed by a centralized Reichsbank. 108 The Dawes plan also set a
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schedule of payment for the reparations but did not deal with the total of reparations nor
set a date for the last payment.
In 1929 a new plan had become necessary because the German economy was
growing exponentially on a very weak foundation. The easy credit and inflation had not
encouraged savings and Germany still had to contend with the reparations. As with
Dawes, an unofficial American delegation was invited by the reparation commission. It
comprised Owen D. Young, J.P. Morgan, and other "heavy" financiers and experts. The
American delegation was to join, in Paris, the delegations from France, England,
Belgium, Italy, Japan, and Germany to form a committee to settle the reparations
problem. Dr. Schacht of the Reichsbank represented Germany.
The Young committee had to come up with a new amount that would satisfy the
former allies and Germany. 109 After four months of tense negotiations the committee
came to a compromise solution acceptable to all parties on 7 June 1929. Germany was to
meet her obligations in fifty-nine annual installments, divided between the "unconditional
portion corresponding to the reparations [ ... ] and the conditional portion strictly
equivalent to the obligations of the German creditors to the United States." 110
Conditional meant that if the United States lowered or cancelled the funds owed them, the
allies would lower or cancel the conditional portion of the reparations due by Germany.
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The installments would begin at 1.65 billion gold marks, to rise to 2.3 billion. 111 For the
first time, a final date for the final payment was set: 1988. 112 The Reparation
Commission was replaced by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) based in Basie,
Switzerland. The creation of the BIS was significant because it meant the removal of
foreign control over Germany's economy. The other purpose of the BIS was to ease
central bank cooperation. The isolationists in the United States Congress, however,
refused the participation of the Federal Reserve Bank. 113 Also significant was that
Germany could request a two-year moratorium on the conditional annuity. Again,
Germany was also to benefit from any reduction of the debt to America. The Young plan
recognized the link between debt and reparations, meaning that if Germany defaulted on
the reparation, the allies could default on their debts. 114 The plan had also received the
unofficial blessing of outgoing President Calvin Coolidge. 115 On 31 May 1929, the
French National Assembly ratified the Young plan despite right wing opposition. In
Germany, Hitler and Alfred Hugenberg, head of the Deutschnationale Volkspartei
(DNVP) failed to prevent the ratification of the Young Plan with a plebiscite held on 22
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December 1929. 116 Politically it was significant that the plan was accepted voluntarily by
Germany, however, reluctantly, rather than imposed. The question of the debt was thus
settled -- or so it seemed.
A few months later, Wall Street crashed, an event which would eventually wreak
world-wide havoc: bankruptcies, falling prices and unemployment. Particularly hard hit
were three of the United States's chief clients: Great Britain, Germany, and Austria.
France alone seemed unaffected. The typical response of all governments to the crisis
was a policy of deflation which resulted in the tightening of the budgets. The other
option would have been an inflationary process, but the example of Germany in 1923 was
too frightening. Herbert Hoover and Ramsay MacDonald wanted to cut their military
budgets, and thus called for a disarmament conference.
Disarmament found few partisans in France -- the rattling of sabers across the
Rhine by Theodor Dilsterberg and Franz Seldte's Stahlhelm (Steel Helmet), and Hitler's
NSDAP (Nazis) made for a powerful deterrent. 117 The French were further appalled by
renewed pressure from the United States and Great Britain to cancel the German war debt
all together. The French would not yield on either account and appeared to many British
and Americans as stingy warmongers and bullies.
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F. The Franco-American relations.
Many Americans viewed the French unfavorably by 1931. Difficulties raised
over Versailles, reparations, war debt, the military occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 harmed
Franco-American relations. In addition, barriers raised by the United States, whether
political or economic, hindered closer ties.
French diplomacy had since the mid-twenties relaxed its ties with America and
had let Great Britain become the go-between. The coming together of Secretary of State
Frank B. Kellogg and French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand was a brilliant exception.
Together, in 1928, they conceived of the Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw war.
French diplomacy was focussed essentially on the League of Nations and thus had
only limited contacts with the United States through the American delegates present in
Geneva in semi-official capacities. Because of their diminutive status, these men held
little recognition in Washington. They were nonetheless key in diplomatic efforts such as
the Young plan.
Aristide Briand directed the French foreign diplomacy. He had held the French
Foreign Ministry during the World War and by 1931 he was, despite many changes in
governments, a quasi-permanent feature of the Quai d'Orsay. 118 When Pierre Laval
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formed his government in 1931, Briand was naturally confirmed in his post as foreign
minister. The old diplomat's greatest accomplishment had been to lay the foundation of
normal relations between France and Germany down, at Locarno in 1925. It was ironic
that what Briand was probably best known for, the outlawing of war, did not occur by
design. It stemmed, not from some high minded aim, but, from France's craving for
security and Briand's attempt at drawing the United States out of isolationism. Briand
thought to lay the basis of a Franco-American alliance by stating in a pact that France and
the United States would never wage war against each other. Kellogg was reluctant to
engage the United States in any bilateral treaties but was pressured by pacifists at home to
pursue the idea. Eventually Briand's idea broadened into a general condemnation of war
as instrument of national policy which was eventually signed by almost every country in
the world. Though devoid of any means of enforcement, the treaty did have the merit to
clearly state the objectional nature of war. Briand had not obtained what he had sought
but gained immense popularity in France and abroad. It also earned Kellogg the 1929
Nobel Peace Prize.
Briand's quest for national security led him also to consider a loose European
Federation. The logic here was of course that nations who governed together were less
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likely to wage war on each other. Briand surveyed the European heads of state but the
proposal for a European Federation did not generate much enthusiasm. 119

G. Franco-German relations
Much French good will vis-a-vis Germany was lost overnight when Stresemann's
personal papers were made public in France in April 1931. The former foreign minister
and chancellor, who had passed away on 3 October 1929, had allegedly written that he
had duped Briand at Thoiry to obtain greater concessions from France. 120 This latest
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development only compounded the awful impression made by Hitler's success in the
elections of 14 September 1930. The Nazi Party went from 12 to 107 seats in the
Reichstag and had become the second largest party after the Social Democrats. Many
Frenchmen felt that they had been tricked in evacuating the Rhineland, especially since
they were barred, by the 1925 Locarno agreement, from reoccupying it. 121
On 3 March 1931 the approval of the foreign ministry's budget by 551 votes
against 14 at the National Assembly marked enthusiastic support ofBriand's policy. 122
Now a few weeks later, Briand, aging but still sharp, had to defend the same policies in
the National Assembly against his enemies -- chiefly, Deputy Henri Franklin-Bouillon -who always opposed his politics. He had barely fended off one barrage of attacks, when
news of the 19 March 1931 Protocol of Vienna outlining an Austro-German Zollunion
(custom union) project reached Paris. 123 This brought the Chamber of Deputies to a boil.
Franklin-Bouillon denounced Briand's lack of foresight. Briand successfully countered
the attack with his usual bite and wit, but he was just as upset by the Austro-German
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proposal as the rest of the assembly. 124 Laval closed the debate in a speech endorsing the
policy of his foreign minister and condemning the Zollzmion. 125
A few weeks later, on 13 May, Briand lost the presidential elections which could
have been the crowning achievement of his illustrious career. Though he had declared his
candidacy at the last moment, it was thought that Briand would win easily over Paul
Doumer and the other candidates. The first ballot put Doumer in the lead with 442 votes
for 401 for Briand, along with 15 votes for Jean Hennessy and 10 for Cachin. 126
Disheartened, Briand chose not to compete in the second round and withdrew his
candidacy. 127 Authors Rene Escaich, Edouard Bonnefous, to name but a few, repeated
the rumors heard in Briand's entourage; namely that it was Premier Laval's fault for
supporting Paul Doumer. 128 Or even worse, that it was a deliberate maneuver by Laval to
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compromise Briand's prestige in the world. 129 These assumptions, however, makes little
sense since Laval was a supporter of Briand and his policy. If indeed Laval wanted
Briand out of the Quai d'Orsay, as some contended, what better way than having Briand
win the presidency! In part the rumor mill got its grist because many thought, wrongly,
of Laval as a creature of Tardieu, and he is said not to have supported Briand in this
instance. Though they were in the same cabinet, Tardieu and Briand did not always see
eye to eye on foreign policy. Blaming Laval or Tardieu was to ignore that the recent
troubles from Germany influenced the vote and was to dismiss the valid candidacy of
Paul Doumer. It should be noted that none of the accusers presented the testimony of a
deputy or a senator to substantiate their accusations.
Furthermore, Briand himself had supported the candidacy of Doumer, before
Briand's entourage (namely Alexis Leger and Gilbert Peycelon according to British
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Ambassador William George Tyrrell) convinced him he should run himself. 130 Yet he did
not clearly declare himself a candidate until the eve of the election. 131 Also why did
Briand withdraw after the first ballot? He could have regained the support of Edouard
Daladier's left-wing Radical Socialists whose votes had failed him the first time. 132
Briand got involved in a race he had not wished to enter, yet the defeat crushed his spirit.
Bitterly disappointed, perhaps believing that he had been betrayed, Briand offered his
resignation, which Laval could not accept. 133 Indeed, Laval succeeded in convincing
Briand to stay. 134 As Ambassador Tyrrell pointed out, the capital of sympathy generated
for Briand because of his defeat ensured the continuance of Briand's policy.13 5
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H. Laval and Briand
No doubt, Briand was physically diminished. Slowly poisoned by the effects of
uremia, he fell asleep at inopportune moments and lacked the drive he once had. Yet he
could still surprise his interlocutors with his knowledge and sharp analysis. 136 During the
year 1931, Laval took an increasing interest in France's foreign diplomacy, which greatly
upset the staff of the Quai d'Orsay. Possibly the entourage could not admit to the fact that
the poet of peace no longer was the man he had been, and certainly did not appreciate that
Laval should tramp on the diplomatic turf. Despite allegations to the contrary, no
evidence supported that Laval aimed at eliminating Briand. In fact, Laval generally
followed the foreign policy established by Briand; Laval's methods; however, were
different. 137
Briand and Laval's friendship dated from the days of the "Stockholm, etoile
polaire" speech. Briand had then showed kindness, when few others dared, to the young
deputy who had dangerously exposed himself. 138 At the exciting times of Locamo,
Briand, then premier and foreign minister, brought Laval from the ministry of public
works to the trusted position of under-secretary to the premier. Briand also gave Laval
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the prestigious post of minister of justice, an essential stepping stone on the path to
premiership. 139
The two men resembled each other. They had similar backgrounds: Briand's
father owned a drinking establishment, Laval's an inn. They were emotionally attached to
the land and delighted in their farms. They were hommes de gauche (men of the left)
though they had abandoned the Socialist Party to become independents. They abhorred
war. Their likeness extended to their personal habits, they were avid smokers of heavy
tobaccos and tended, by 1930s standard, to be slovenly. 140
Their difference revealed itself in their respective diplomatic methods. While
Briand was a great believer in the League of Nations and used his orator's talents in its
arena, Laval never shared Briand's faith in the League and preferred personal contacts
with the other heads of state. 141 Laval also frequently used the telephone to contact his
interlocutors directly and get their immediate reaction. 142 It was this personal approach

139

Cole, Laval, 89.

140

Bernard Oudin, Aristide Briand, 537-538. Laval would smoke two to three packs ofBaltos daily, harsh
tobacco which would yellow his fingers and blacken his teeth. Cointet, Pierre Laval, 93. Kupferman
reported that he would smoke anything Gitanes, Bastos, Gauloises as well as American cigarettes one after
another transforming everything in a smoke den. Kupferman, Laval, 1987, 74.
Madame Boussard noted Premier Laval's sloppy eating in a chance encounter in a dining car.
Conversation with Madame Jacqueline Boussard, June 1991.
141

"voir ce qu'ils ont dans le ventre" (lit. to see what they have in the gut). Jacquemin, La vie publique, 81.
"Laval[ ... ] a le mepris de la SDN." (Laval[ ... ] has contempt for the league) Kupferman, Laval, 1987, 77.
142

Mallet, Pierre Laval, Des annees obscures, 48.

56

that allowed him to meet with many significant leaders of his time: Ramsay MacDonald,
Benito Mussolini, Josef Stalin, Adolf Hitler, and Herbert Clark Hoover.
America's isolationism, the war debt problems, France's difficult relations not
only with its former enemy but also its British and American allies, the economic chaos
in Germany and the effects of the Wall Street debacle on global economies had the
diplomatic field on edge. Briand's diplomacy which had generated so much hope for the
reconciliation of France and Germany was under attack at home. The announcement of
President Hoover's moratorium, against a backdrop of international and national tension,
gave Laval his first diplomatic challenge.
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CHAPTER

III
THE HOOVER MORATORIUM

The Hoover Moratorium of 1931, the proposal of the American president to freeze
all intergovernmental debt for a one-year period, according to author and political advisor
McGeorge Bundy, was "the most significant action taken by an American president for
Europe since Woodrow Wilson's administration." 143 The reality was that the United
States had enormous stakes in Germany: long-term German borrowers owed the United
States private sector more than $1.25 billion; the short-term debt neared $1 billion. By
comparison, the entire United States national income in 1931 was just $54 billion. To put
it into perspective, authors Walter Lippmann and William 0. Scroggs stated in The
United States in World Affairs, An Account ofAmerican Foreign Relations, that "the

American stake in Germany's government and private obligations was equal to half that
of all the rest of the world combined." 144
The proposed moratorium would also benefit Great Britain's investment in
Germany's private sector making more likely the repayment of those loans while the
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public indebtedness was frozen. It certainly was in Hoover's interest to offer aid to an
ailing British economy in light of Great Britain's indebtedness to the United States.
France, on the other hand, had a relatively small stake in Germany's private debt but a
huge interest in German reparations; and payment to France would be compromised
under Hoover's moratorium. 145

A. The Zollunion
The impetus for Hoover's proposal for the moratorium emerged from a new
financial crisis in central Europe. The customs union (Zollunion) between Germany and
Austria was at the root of the problem.
On 19 March 1931, Austrian Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister Johannes
Schober and German Foreign Secretary Julius Curtius publicly expressed a desire to
create a customs union, an economic agreement specifically forbidden under the 1919
Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye as was "any act which might [ ... ] compromise
[Austria's] independence." 146 This prohibition was further underscored in the Geneva
Protocol of October 1922, in which, in exchange for aid, Austria agreed to "not violate
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her economic independence by granting to any State a special regime or exclusive
advantages calculated to threaten this independence. " 147 The Austrian and German
financial markets reacted favorably to the announcement, but of course the proposed
formation fell under immediate scrutiny.
Public opinion in France, fearing any resurgence of the Teutonic threat, was
loudly reflected in the French press. The Council of the League of Nations started
debating the legitimacy of the customs union. To avoid further turmoil Schober and
Curtius withdrew the Zollunion project which announcement caused the German and
Austrian markets to falter. 148 Eventually the International Court at The Hague would
strike the proposal down and confirm its demise.
Schober and Curtius, attempting to justify their actions, claimed they revealed
their project in response to rampant rumors that arose when the two met in Vienna. They
continued they wanted to avoid surprising the world with afait accompli and that they
saw the Zollunion as a precursor to a greater European free trade union. They added that
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they were well aware of their treaty obligations and intended to submit their proposal to
the League ofNations. 149 No one believed them.
Looking back, it appeared the Zollunion project could have existed since February
1930, and possibly as far back as 1927. 150 According to German Foreign Ministry
Staatssekretiir Bernhard von Billow, its release was timed to coincide with the review of
Briand's European union proposal "to give it a pan-European cloak." 151
Curtius retained his ministry but as a diplomat he was finished, from then on the
foreign policy of Germany would be conducted by Chancellor Brilning. 152 The entire
diplomatic debacle only led to distrust and bruised pride. It was yet another event that
perpetuated the widespread belief that "German diplomacy" was an oxymoron in any
language.
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B. The Credit Anstalt' s Crack
Author William Starr Myers wrote that the French recalled the short-term
securities held in Austria and Germany to force the withdrawal of the customs project. 153
The assumption that French financial sanctions rippled through the already fragile
Austrian economy and caused the ruin, in May 1931, of the Credit Anstalt, the largest
bank of Austria, was tempting but wholly unsubstantiated. 154 If the French did take part
in the monetary disaster, it was by refusing to open new credits without political
concessions after the Credit Anstalt's crack. 155 The French conditional assistance
denounced as blackmail did of course not help Franco-German relations. 156
Central Europe was panic-stricken. Banks runs were especially acute in Austria
and in Germany; foreign investors followed suit. Hoover thought Germany and Austria
were heading for disaster. The President feared that a new financial collapse of Germany
would have grave consequences for American investors and the American economy. The
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American national income was dropping steadily. From $82.7 billion in 1929, it fell to
$69 billion in 1930, and $54 billion in 1931, reaching its lowest point at $40 billion in
1932. 157 Hoover felt he had to intervene to advert a new financial disaster for America.
On 5 June, Hoover confided to Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson that he
thought a moratorium was necessary. 158 Stimson approved wholeheartedly but the
president now hesitated, wondering if it would do more harm than good. One of his
concerns was that it would link the war debts and the reparations, a link that had only
been admitted unofficially because of the Young plan. 159 The situation in Europe grew
worse and on 18 June Hoover made his decision and thought and obtained the support of
the leading members of the House and Senate including, of course, the all-important
Senator Borah. 160

C. Announcement and Reception of the Moratorium
To succeed fully the moratorium needed the endorsement of the other large
creditor nations, in particular France. On the afternoon of Friday, 19 June 1931, Stimson
informed French Ambassador Paul Claude! of a proposed suspension of all
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intergovernmental debt. 161 McGeorge Bundy reported that the next day President Hoover
was forced to announce the moratorium because of rumors originating from Capitol
Hill. 162 The president released a press statement that mentioned a plan "directed to
strengthening the situation in Germany" which had received a "gratifying" response from
the "leaders of both parties." 163
At the time Stimson communicated Hoover's moratorium in Washington on
Friday afternoon it was evening in Paris, and Briand had left for the country, probably for
his property in Normandy. Philippe Berthelot, Secretaire General du Quai d'Orsay, was
on hand to receive Claudel's telegram. 164 Most members of the government and the
National Assembly, however, were informed of the Moratorium through the weekend
press. It was not until late Sunday morning that United States Ambassador in Paris,
Walter Evans Edge, who had not been fully informed of the new proposal either, was able
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to get a clear picture from the decoded telegrams. 165 It was now Edge's privilege to
explain the United States' actions at a reception which happened to be held that day by
President Doumer for the members of the Diplomatic corps and the French Government
officials at the Longchamps races. Edge recalled:
My arrival at Longchamps was something of a sensation because
the announcement of the moratorium had already appeared in the early
afternoon newspapers, and members of both the French government and of
the diplomatic corps were waiting for an explanation. After presenting my
compliments to the President, I drew aside M. Flandin, the Minister of
Finance, told him briefly what I knew of the President's announcement,
adding:
"The President has certainly made a remarkable contribution to a
solution of the pressing financial problem, hasn't he, Mr. Minister?"
Mr. Flandin unhesitatingly replied: "Yes, Mr. Ambassador, but
you must realize that France occupies a very different relationship to
German obligations compared to Great Britain or any of the other allies,
including the United States." 166
Despite his bravado, Edge knew full well that the moratorium and the events leading up
to the moratorium -- in addition of Hoover's poor sense of timing -- had several elements
that could only enrage the French.
Not only had the French not been consulted, but the British and the Germans
appeared to have been. The impression was created by a meeting held at the country
residence of the British prime minister MacDonald in Chequers, England. from 5 to 9
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June 1931. MacDonald and his Foreign Secretary Henderson met with German
Chancellor Heinrich Bruning and Foreign Secretary Curtius. 167
Chequers was essentially a public relations ploy, the British hoping to strengthen
the position of Bruning after another Nazi success in the elections in Oldenburg. 168 On
the one hand they did discuss the feasibility of a moratorium: on the other no word of it
had been given to the press. 169 Henderson, however, had duly briefed Briand of these
developments. 170 Soon after the Chequers meeting the British statesmen met with United
States Secretary of the Treasury Andrew W. Mellon, who arrived in London on 16 June.
These meetings, in combination with the formal announcement of the
moratorium, now excited suspicion in French parliamentary circles always wary of the
perfidious Albion. 171 Again, suspicion was not justified, for Stimson referred to this
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specific moratorium in a phone conversation with Ramsay MacDonald only as early as 19
June, the same day on which French ambassador Claudel was notified. 172
The awful misunderstanding was further strengthened by Dr. Hjalmar Schacht of
the Reichsbank. Schacht had become an active pro-Nazi after the December 1930
election and was, at the time of the announcement, on a conference tour in the United
States advocating the end of reparations. 173 This was of course echoed by the American
bankers who were concerned about their foolish investments in Germany and hoped to
alleviate the German burden so that they might be reimbursed. 174
Suspicion was compounded by the plea made by President Paul von Hindenburg.
Author William Starr Myers believed it was "spontaneous." 175 It was in fact staged at the
request of President Hoover to justify his actions to the American public. As Robert
Lambel, journalist for the weekly L 'Illustration, remarked, normal protocol would have
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had Chancellor Briining make the call. 176 The study of the telegrams and dispatches
clearly showed that the plea had been requested. 177 To Hoover's credit, the request was
only put out on 19 June 1931, again on the same day Claudel was apprised.
The question of "conspiracy" aside, the moratorium procedure established in the
Young plan had been blatantly disregarded by President Hoover. Under the Young Plan
any moratorium had to be announced three months in advance. The impending financial
catastrophe that caused Hoover to act without taking into consideration that the French
and the British had just made their payments to the United States, while Germany had not
paid America's European allies. 178 Even worse, the president took a stand against the
reparations:
We [the United States government] purposely did not participate in either
general reparations or the division of colonies or property. The repayment
of debts due to us from the Allies for the advances for war and
reconstruction was settled upon a basis not contingent upon German
reparations. Therefore reparations are necessarily wholly a European
problem with which we have no relation. 179
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,------

--------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

If the Chamber of Deputies accepted the moratorium as it was, the Young plan would

become obsolete. The prospect and the uncertainty of new negotiations was, at best,
upsetting. The deputies also had to consider public opinion: after all had the army not
occupied the Ruhr only eight years earlier to secure these reparations? Had the Rhineland
not been evacuated by Tardieu the year before in response to the Young Plan? 180 The
French had been extremely disappointed, for rather than subsiding, the revisionist
diatribes in Germany against France, the Versailles treaty, and the Young plan had only
grown in intensity. 181 For many French, force seemed the only language the Germans
understood. Only concerns of France's position and reputation in the world moderated
the outcry for an outright rejection of Hoover's moratorium.

D. Franco-American Negotiations
The negotiations, which could have been conducted with discretion prior to the
announcement, were now held under world scrutiny. France had been placed in a
position which could have national and international repercussions: the coalition
supporting Laval's government could disintegrate over this issue or Hoover might
withdraw his proposal and lay the blame on France.
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As mentioned above, on Sunday, 21 June 1931, Edge met informally with the
French government at Longchamp. Pierre-Etienne Flandin made it clear at that time that
the circumstances surrounding the proposal of the moratorium were thought to be
suspicious in French parliamentary circles. 182 Flandin also suggested that a visit of
Andrew Mellon to Paris would help allay these suspicions. Laval wondered: "Ifwe do
renounce our right to reparation payments for our devastated regions, what guarantee will
be given us by the United States and Great Britain that these payments will be resumed at
the end of one year?" 183 Without Briand, expected back on Monday late afternoon,
Berthelot was a privileged interlocutor. The Quai d'Orsay's second-in-charge
characterized the proposal as "very interesting." 184
Edge, who had a clear understanding of the French reaction, was able to convey it
to his government. Washington took the words of Plandin very seriously, and Hoover
asked Mr. Mellon to travel to Paris "as soon as possible." 185 Stimson also cabled
Frederick M. Sackett, United States Ambassador in Germany, to urge Bruning and
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Curtius to "do whatever can be done to clear away any [French] misapprehensions which
may [ ... ] exist." 186
The French outcry was particularly frustrating for Hoover in the light of the
generally positive world response to his proposal. 187 Some nations, such as Great Britain,
Belgium, Hungary had reservations about the breadth of the proposal but would bend to
what was hoped to be the greater good of the majority. 188
Edge met again with Berthelot on Monday. Berthelot reassured the American
ambassador that he knew that the French government had been kept properly appraised
despite the allegations in the French press to the contrary. Berthelot agreed that
international measures such as the Hoover proposal were necessary to respond to the
situation in Germany. However agreeable the Quai's number two was, the decision
makers were Briand and Laval. Berthelot could only promise that the matter of the
proposal would be the first item on the agenda for the Tuesday cabinet meeting. 189
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Edge was finally able to meet with Briand. He hoped that Briand would exert a
moderating influence on the discussion. He was disappointed. Briand felt that Hoover's
proposal was but another blow against his efforts at Franco-German reconciliation.
Briand was particularly rankled by the method Hoover had chosen to announce the plan.
France was being treated as an enemy nation not an ally. He suspected that the president
of the Bank of England, Montagu Norman, had had a hand in the plans during his visit to
New York a few weeks back. Finally, he surmised that the Germans must have intimated
that the French not be consulted. Yet despite his ire, Briand promised he would make the
French reply as conciliatory as possible. 190
Flandin, the finance minister, in a meeting with Laval underscored the tremendous
cost for France, two billion francs, and favored rejection of the moratorium. 191 Tardieu
and the war minister Andre Maginot agreed with Flandin. Maginot might have been
additionally irritated at Hoover's call for French disarmament. The "cheerless giant"
Flandin represented the Alliance Democratique, a small but essential party in Laval's
majority in the chamber. 192 Laval, however, sought a compromise solution. He was
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much more receptive to the Berthelot's idea of conveying the unconditional portion of the
German reparations to the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). 193

J. Theodore Marriner, the United States Counselor of Embassy, met with Laval on
Monday afternoon. Laval indicated that his government would accept the proposal under
the stipulation that the unconditional portion of the debt should be given to the BIS. 194
This was not acceptable to Hoover, and Edge was urged to convey this to Laval as soon
as possible, preferably before the Cabinet meeting. 195
Laval received Edge at the Ministry of the Interior between cabinet sessions. To
avoid the press hounds, Edge made a discreet entrance through a side door. Laval
"apologized for the tone of the French press and the tendency of some parliamentarians to
go, as he described it, 'beyond the bounds of decency' in their attack on President Hoover
and his proposal." 196 Edge explained the purpose of his visit, to which Laval responded
that the French government wished the German government to pay the unconditional part

193

The Bank oflntemational Settlements (BIS) had been set up by the Young Plan. Bruce Kent The
Spoils of War; The Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy of Reparations, 1918-1932 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1989), 291, 309, 325, 335.
194

"Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Boal)" Washington, 23 June
1931, FRUS, 1931, vol. I, 54-55.

195

"The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Edge)," Washington, 23 June 1931, FRUS, 1931,
vol. I, 55.
196

Edge, A Jerseyman's Journal, 196.

73

to the BIS so that these funds not be diverted to the construction of pocket battle ships,
unfair competition (dumping) or "exploitation of the countries to the east." 197
Laval and Edge met again after the cabinet meeting. Laval's position remained
unchanged, and he urged the United States government not to do anything until Friday
when the French response would be up for a vote at the National Assembly. The
National Assembly vote was necessary because the proposal breached the Young Plan,
and only the Assembly had the power to approve these changes. 198 He also indicated that
he had already arranged to invite Bruning to Paris. Laval was appreciative of Briining's
radio speech in which he had thanked Hoover for his proposal and hoped for a FrancoGerman understanding. 199
On 25 June Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon made it across the
Channel. 200 Mellon had been sent to Paris from London both to allay French suspicion
and to obtain an agreement. 201 Flandin met with his American counterpart but was clearly
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unimpressed by Mellon's justifications.202 After a few days of inescapable negotiations
between the government and the key members of the National Assembly on the one hand
and between the French and Americans on the other, Laval addressed the National
Assembly at 3 :00 p.m. Friday, 26 June 1931. As author Kupferman put it: "the jurist of
the Quai prepared him a speech, which spared the goat and the cabbage. 11203 It agreed in
principle to the moratorium but insisted that the sanctity of the Young plan should be
maintained. Despite their aversion to the moratorium Flandin and Tardieu stood by
Laval.
The gathered deputies had to vote on the survival of the Laval government. The
ensuing debate lasted until the wee hours of the night. Finally at 6:30 a.m. the following
day, the Laval "Government obtained a vote of confidence, the result being 386 to
189." 204 If Laval did not obtain the full support of his own majority, he did receive the
support of the Socialists (SFIO), won over by the Premier's intervention. 205 Laval's
Minister of Agriculture, Tardieu stifled a great deal of the opposition on the right. Again
Tardieu wanted to reject the moratorium but out of governmental solidarity and
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friendship he gave his support to Laval. 206 Some deputies had also been in part mollified
by Chancellor Brilning's radio address to the German people, in which he had welcomed
the Hoover initiative, but more importantly expressed his confidence in improved FrancoGerman relations. 207 The Chamber, while approving Laval's response to the Hoover
proposition, underscored its attachment to the Young plan, which Hoover had badly
bruised in his announcement of the moratorium. 208
While the vote had for all intents and purposes been an endorsement of the
Hoover moratorium, Laval's enemies made great issue of the negotiations held after the
vote which had extended until 6 July 1931. These negotiations between Edge, Mellon,
Marriner, and Pell on the American side, and Laval, Briand, Flandin, Pietri and
Franc;ois-Poncet on the French side essentially imposed on a reluctant Hoover a facesaving measure: the German payment was to be turned over to the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) as bonds guaranteed by the German railways. 209
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Mellon at the microphones and, from left to right, Pietri, Laval, Edge, Briand and Flandin.
L 'Illustration, 4 July 1931

The delay of seventeen days, following the Hoover's announcement, was blamed
for the moratorium's lack of success. 210 Undeniably the initial response had been
extremely positive. The American, British and German financial markets responded
favorably to the Hoover moratorium. 211 The euphoria, however, was short-lived, and it
was easy to argue that France's delayed response had undermined the psychological
impact of the moratorium. 212
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This was essentially a weak argument, as for all intents and purposes the plan
received French endorsement the day of the vote at the National Assembly. 213
Furthermore, American investors weakened the moratorium as they resumed their
withdrawal of funds from Germany which had been only temporarily checked
immediately after the announcement of the moratorium. Henderson noted:
The arrangements proposed in Franco-American agreement have not
sufficed to restore confidence in [the] future economic position of
Germany, and it is to be feared that markets tend now to regard the year's
moratorium as an opportunity to withdraw their remaining credit from
Germany rather than as an inducement to leave them there, still less to
increase them. 214
The grave misunderstanding between the French and American governments was
a direct consequence of the United States and France's lackadaisical diplomatic ties.
Stimson was well aware that prior negotiations were necessary but felt he had to wait for
the president's decision before he could submit the plan to the French.
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Again, had the bond between America and France been closer, Hoover or Stimson
could have communicated directly with Briand or Laval, as Hoover, Edge and Mellon did
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over the transatlantic phone during the above-mentioned negotiations.216 Instead, these
events created additional ill will between the two countries.
The Hoover moratorium, even if applied in full force, would not have triggered
the hoped for world recovery. Internationally, the success of the nationalists, in the
elections of September 1930, had already lessened the confidence in Germany. 217 David
Carlton argued "Hoover's plan was in any case inadequate, because it failed to tackle the
essential destabilizing factor, which was German self-pity and not intergovernmental
debts." 218
An additional consideration was the supposition of deliberate sabotage by the
Germans of their own economy to avoid payment. Such a concept was alien to
mercantile British and Americans. To cynical Frenchmen it was plausible. 219 Undeniably
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the high inflation before 1924 allowed the German government to wipe its internal debt
and permitted the industry to clear its mortgages and bonds. Of course it did mean the
ruin of the middle class. 220
Because of poor communication France and the United States missed an
opportunity to help the world economy. Though the Hoover Moratorium was put in place
the hoped for positive impact on the German market did not occur and in the end it
generated much ill will between Washington and Paris. Secretary of State Stimson, more
worldly than his President, thought to improve this state of affairs by traveling to Europe.
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CHAPTER
IV
NEW FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE GOLD STANDARD

A. All roads lead to Paris
Secretary Stimson had planned a visit to Europe long before the moratorium
cns1s. Since the affairs of the planet seeming somewhat stable after the moratorium,
Stimson left for Europe with the president's blessing. He wanted to observe the Old
World's problems first hand and to establish personal contacts with the European
leaders. 221
Stimson's intention was to dedicate most of his trip to leisure and only a small
portion to work. In Italy he was able to do just that. He met with Benito Mussolini and
visited the sights. When he reached France, however, the German economy had taken a
turn for the worse. As mentioned above, Hoover's call for a moratorium caused the
American banks to increase the withdrawal of their investments in Germany and German
capital to take flight. Dr. Hans Luther, president of the Reichsbank since 1930, had
attempted to secure more loans and called for assistance causing renewed panic. 222 On 13

Secretary Stimson's amiable appearance hid a strong will. A Yale and Harvard Law graduate he had
fought in the World War as colonel. During the William Howard Taft administration he served as war
secretary, post he also held under Franklin D. Roosevelt from 1940 to 1945.
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July the Darmstadter und Nationalbank (Danat), after having supported a number of
failing industries, collapsed with the bankruptcy of the Nordwolle, the textile giant of
Bremer. 223 To avoid further panic the Berlin Stock Exchange was closed. 224 Premier
MacDonald called for an international conference to be held in London possibly to revise
the Versailles treaty. 225 The relief if any provided by the moratorium had been short
lived.
Stimson arrived in Paris on 15 July 1931 and went directly to the American
embassy. There, United States Ambassador Walter Evans Edge had arranged for a
meeting with British Foreign Secretary Henderson, who was in Paris to initiate
negotiations between the French and the Germans.226 In response to Chequers,
MacDonald and Henderson had been invited to come to Berlin the weekend of 18-19
July. Henderson had planned to travel to Berlin later that week. The trip was not to be:
MacDonald contacted Henderson earlier that morning to cancel the travel plans in favor
of an international conference to be held in London. 227 This did not particularly suit
Henderson, as he was convinced that a solution to the German problem had to involve the
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French. He had hoped to convince Bruning to make some concessions to the French such
as halting the construction of new pocket battleships. 228 The cancellation disappointed
Bruning as well. 229
On the afternoon of 15 July, Henderson was fresh from a conference with Laval
and Briand with whom he had been discussing a long-term loan to Germany, met with
Stimson. Henderson, for whom finance was apparently not a forte, had difficulty
conveying what had been talked about. 230 According to author David Carlton,
Henderson's lack of financial savvy was compounded by the demeanor of Governor of
the Bank of England Montagu Collet Norman. Indeed the latter distrusted the former and
in their dealings purposely kept him in the dark as to the financial situation of Britain.
Thus, Henderson could not evaluate the feasibility of British loans to Germany. 231

A

few days after this conversation, Chancellor of the Exchequer Viscount Philip Snowden
informed Henderson of England's incapacity to open further credits to Germany. 232
Stimson told his British colleague that for financial reasons loans guaranteed by the
United States were out of the question. Hoover had been quite adamant on this subject.
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The British foreign secretary further reported to Stimson of his meeting with
Laval and Briand, stating that the French were also unwilling to extend credits to
Germany. Their motivations, however, were essentially political. According to
Henderson, Laval and Briand "had remarked that they did not care to lend money to
Bruening and then have it spent by Hitler." 233
In his discussion with Laval and Briand, Henderson also debated the Conference
in London. The French thought that calling a consultation without defined objectives was
a mistake. According to Henderson, Laval and Briand wanted to hear his report on the
situation in Berlin before making their final decision on the Conference. 234
"We must know" said M. Laval [ ... ]"exactly what the situation is."
"Can the present government commit itself in the name of the country?
Does it represent her? Is there a danger of its being replaced by
Hugenberg and Hitler? Is Germany ready to accept our conditions?" 235
Carlton reported that Henderson had mentioned a "political moratorium of five
and even ten years" to Laval and Briand. 236 In his memorandum of20 July, Henderson
refers to such a moratorium without claiming patemity. 237 Whether this idea was the
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brainchild of Laval or Henderson is but a point of detail. The fact was that Laval
embraced the concept and would make every effort to achieve such a political
moratoriU.m between France and Germany.
After his meeting with Stimson, Henderson went to the Colonial Exhibition for a
dinner where he was the guest of honor of Colonial Minister Paul Reynaud. 238 Henderson
was contacted there by the British Embassy. Because Germany seemed unable to meet
its private obligations to the Bank of England, grave financial problems were brewing in
London, and MacDonald requested immediate action.
Because Laval present at the dinner, Henderson initiated an impromptu meeting
with the premier. Laval called upon Reynaud to join them. Conveying the gravity of the
British situation, Henderson, despite considerable resistance, "induced M. Laval to agree
[ ... ] to attend a conference in London on Tuesday (the 21st July) on the condition that
the German Ministers would first visit Paris [ ... ]." 239 A later telegram informed
Henderson that the conference had been moved up to Monday, 20 July. Henderson
telephoned Laval, who made no objections as long as he could meet with the Germans
beforehand. Henderson then called MacDonald to report the latest developments.

Paul Reynaud had the sad privilege to be premier during the phony war and the disaster of May-June
1940. Aware of the impending German threat yet incapable of imposing his views.
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Some time after midnight, German ambassador in Paris Leopold von Roesch
came to the British Embassy at Henderson's request. 240 Henderson communicated the
urgency of a meeting and requested that the German Chancellor leave immediately for
Paris. 241 Brilning could of course not comply immediately, as he was dealing with the
consequences of the collapse of the Danat. The flight of capital compounded this
problem and directly affected his government's capacity to meet payroll. In his
desperation, Brilning even flew in Harvard professor and financial expert Oliver Sprague
to help find a solution to the emergency. 242 Having contemplated and rejected the
printing of "ersatz" money with Reichsbank President Luther and the director of the
Commerz- und Privatbank, Friedrich Reinhart, Briining enacted several decrees that
allowed him to close the banks and the bond-market on 14 and 15 July for the rest of the
week, leaving only the Reichsbank open for selected transactions. 243 The one positive
element to the financial chaos was that Hugenberg and Hitler did not have access to their
funds to back anti-government manifestations.
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With Germany's finances under control, al least temporarily, at 2:00 a.m. on 16
July, Bruning heard from Billow that the German Foreign ministry did not object to the
voyage. It is possible that Laval's warm answer to Brilning's radio address of 23 June
1931 encouraged this willingness. 245 Briining also received the blessing of
Hindenburg. 246
Hoesch was informed that the German delegation would leave for Paris on Friday,
17 July, provided the French extend an invitation. 247 Despite the certainty in France of
right-wing opposition to a German visit, Laval and his cabinet extended an invitation to
the representatives of the Weimar Republic, which in itself was a positive step for the
Franco-German relations.
On 16 July at the American embassy, Secretary Stimson, Ambassador Edge and
embassy staffer J. Theodore Marriner met with Premier Laval and the ministers Briand
(Foreign Affairs), Pierre-Etienne Flandin (Finance), Fran9ois Pietri (Budget), and UnderSecretary Andre Fran9ois-Poncet (National Economy). 248 Secretary Henderson and
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Ambassador Tyrrell represented the British. 249 The purpose of this gathering essentially
aimed at setting the agenda of the upcoming meeting with the Germans and the London
Conference.
Laval opened the talks by suggesting they should invite the Italian delegation, as
they would pass through Paris on their way to London, to join the parties present.
Stimson reported: "Henderson immediately objected indignantly to a conference on
Sunday [19 July] of all nations. "250 The compromise solution to Laval's proposal of a
widening of the talks to include the Italian delegation was found. The French would meet
with the Germans Saturday. On Sunday, in addition to the parties already involved, a
general "conversation" would be held with the Italians, the Belgians and the Japanese. 251
Henderson's opposition to a widening of the "conversations" to include the
Italians was due less to MacDonald's desire not to allow anything that would undermine
the London Conference (Stimson had received similar directives from Hoover), than to
his wish that the French and the Germans meet alone. 252 Henderson and MacDonald had
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diverging views on foreign politics and in this instance the British prime minister had
called for the London Conference without consulting his foreign secretary. 253
Henderson was thus prevented from going to Berlin and, in tum, from updating
the French on the German situation. Against MacDonald's will, he invited the German
ministers to come to France through the good offices ofHoesch. 254 MacDonald was kept
unaware of these developments and indubitably would have opposed had he known of
them. Laval and Henderson agreed that nothing could be accomplished in London
without prior negotiations. 255
Another obstacle to full attendance at and success of the London Conference was
MacDonald's prior allusion to a possible revision of the Versailles treaty. The timing of
this suggestion was terrible. French public opinion could not possibly be asked to
swallow another affront on the scale of the Hoover moratorium. Henderson understood
this and so did Stimson, together they leaned on MacDonald so that only the financial
situation in Germany would be discussed in London. 256 There was added incentive for
Stimson to control the scope of the London Conference, as Hoover did not want America
involved in any discussion ofreparations. The final obstacle for an effective London
Conference was the as yet unresolved issue of the French attendance. Laval was under
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great pressure not to consent to the London conference altogether, both from the press
and members of his cabinet, namely Tardieu, Flandin and Maginot. British Ambassador
Tyrrell hoped that Laval's moderation would prevail.257 From a conversation he had with
Flandin on the 17 July and with Laval on the morning of 18 July, Stimson was hopeful as
well. 258 Nevertheless, ifthe French did not come to an agreement with the Germans at the
upcoming meeting, Laval would have the greatest difficulties convincing his cabinet to
participate in the London Conference. 259

B. The Paris Meeting
The "ambassadors of German misery," Bruning and Curtius, arrived in Paris,
Saturday, 18 July 1931, after a fourteen-hour trip. 260 Bulow, the secretary-general of the
German foreign ministry, and Graf Lutz Schwerin von Krosigk, Director at the Ministry
of Finance, and the interpreter Paul Schmidt accompanied them. 261 Ambassador Roesch
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met his countrymen at Jeumont near the Franco-Belgian border to inform Bruning of the
latest developments in Paris. 262
Laval, Briand, and other members of the French cabinet, surrounded by a friendly
crowd, received the German ministers at the train station. 263 Outside the station, however,
demonstrators of the Action Fran9aise were lying in wait. The adverse impression made
by the protesters was in part mollified by pension minister Jean Champetier de Ribes,
described by Bruning as "extraordinarily congenial." 264 De Ribes told Bruning that he

Bernhard Wilhelm von Bulow (1885-1936) should not to be confused with Prince Bernhard von
Billow (1849-1929), Kaiser Wilhelm Il's foreign minister and later ambassador to Italy. Bernhard Wilhelm
was the prince's nephew and Secretary of State of the Foreign Office (1930-1934). Webster's biographical
Dictionary (Springfield Massachusetts: G. & C. Merriam Company, 1974), 212.
As of 15 July, the following were also to be part of the delegation: Dr. Fritz Berger (Finance
Ministry), Noeldeke (Ministry for Foreign Affairs), Litter (German Commissioner for Deliveries in Kind in
Paris), Ronde (Ministry of Economics). "Mr. Newton to Mr. Henderson." 15 July 1931, BDFA, Germany,
1931, Doc. 152, p. 186. Their presence in Paris or London was not confirmed.
262

Bruning, Memoiren, 327.

263

Kupferman wrote that the German delegation got off the plane. Kupferman, Laval, 1987, 91. Briining
in his Memoiren recalled Laval receiving them at the station ("die Bahn"). Heinrich Bruning, Memoiren,
1918-1934 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1970), 327. Curtius, Sechs Jahre, 218.

264

"auBerordenlich sympatische[r] Pensionminister Champetier de Ribes," Bruning, Memoiren, 327.
(Jean Jules Marie) Auguste Champetier de Ribes: During World War I he rose from the ranks and
ended the war as a captain despite the loss of two fingers on his right hand. Founder of the Parti
Democrate Populaire (center). Champetier de Ribes, was pension minister in the second Tardieu and the
first, second and third Laval governments. The Parti Democrate Populaire would support Laval's fourth
government in 1935. Champetier de Ribes was convinced of the necessity ofa Franco-German
rapprochement and was active during Bruning's visit. In 1940 he refused to vote for Petain and organized
the maquis "combat" in the Beam. Arrested in 1942 he is freed in 1945. At Nuremberg he presented the
accusation in the name of France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. He showed consideration
for the vanquished by urging to keep the sentences in proportion to the crimes. He was immensely
disappointed by the intractable verdicts. President of the National Assembly he was also an unsuccessful
candidate to become the first President of the Fourth Republic. "Auguste Champetier de Ribes (18821947)" Dictionnaire des Par/ementaires Fran9ais, Notices Biographiques sur /es Ministres, Deputes et
Senateurs Fran9ais de 1889 a 1940, tome III (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963), 951-956.

91

could trust Laval fully and hoped that after the meeting, the political questions could be
laid to rest for the next ten years. 265
Laval and Bruning "had an hour [and a half] long tete-a-tete" before the opening
of the Franco-German talks later that aftemoon. 266 Briand conversed with Curtius. 267 As
Bruning was fluent in French, there were no translators nor any other witnesses.
According to Bruning's record of the conversation,
Laval began the conversation by apologizing for the demonstration of the
Action Fran9aise at our [Bruning, Curtius ... ] arrival. He was
extraordinarily amiable. No doubt, he fully understood the significance of
the hour and heartily and completely believed in a reconciliation with
Germany. He also spoke of hard opposition in his cabinet against this
idea. I assumed that he meant Tardieu. 268
Bruning expressed his regrets over the Zollunion misunderstanding and discussed
the necessity of "economic cooperation in southeastern Europe" modeled after the Briand
project. Laval's response to this argument was polite. 269 Indubitably because of the

Zollunion blunder, the position of Laval and especially Briand's was uncomfortable. As
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mentioned above, Briand's detente policy toward Germany had been greatly tarnished by
this episode. 270
Laval and Brilning further discussed the mood of Germany. Laval saw the rise of
Nazism as a direct consequence of the Germans' toleration of anti-French agitation.
Bruning responded that the anti-French feelings were the result of the oppression by
French generals in the once-occupied territories. To moderate these words, the German
Chancellor added that a solution should have been found in Geneva. Laval agreed.
The French premier then opened with the concept of a ten-year political
moratorium. France would extend a loan of several billion francs, about 500 million
dollars, in exchange for which Germany would not call for revisions for ten years. 271
Brilning wondered what this would mean with regard to the reparations. Assuredly
Germany would be able to pay for reparations, but Brilning did not want that. 272 As
Franyois-Poncet, then under-secretary to the Premier, saw it, Brilning did not seek more
loans for Germany. Loans had been Germany's downfall:
Truth to tell, what he wanted was the scrapping of reparation payments,
That and that alone could allay nationalist agitation within the Reich. But
he dared not say so; he feared quite rightly, that such pretensions must
create a scandal and loose a new tempest in France if not elsewhere. He
preferred to wait, to procrastinate, to prepare the ground, trying,
meanwhile, to gain the sympathy of his interlocutors and to convince them
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of the honesty of his intentions. In point of fact his game was not so
honest as he gave one to believe; it was full of mental reservations
[ ••• ].273

It appeared, however, that Brlining rejected the loan on the bases of the conditions

for later that day he discussed with the Americans: Germany's need for further credit.274
Briining thought and said that the political moratorium was a political impossibility. He
reported in his memoirs that he was particularly concerned that it would crush the
glimmer of hope in Germany, especially that of the youth. Should he renounce the
revision of the Versailles treaty he would be swept out ofpower. 275 According to
Geoffrey Warner -- who consulted the Documents of the German foreign ministry and
chancellery at the Foreign Office Library in London -- Briining agreed with the concept
but proposed to limit it to one year. 276
This short tete-a-tete was a turning point for Laval. He had prepared for a
confrontation, and there the heavy hand of the hardliners Tardieu, Maginot, and Flandin,
was apparent. The French had banked that Germany's desperate financial situation would
induce her to any conditions, however, drastic. The scenario that would have had
Germany accept a margin of international control over its finances and refrain from
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political revisionism for a period of ten years, in exchange for a generous loan of 500
million dollars, was annihilated by Brilning's unexpected refusal. 277
Joii:it Franco-German economic development was not in the plans for this
meeting. Yet the two leaders found themselves discussing such a development as a basis
for Franco-German understanding. 278 This theme would be developed further in the
coming months. This is not to say that Franco-German economic cooperation did not
exist prior to this meeting. The International Steel Agreement of 1926 was an example.
But this showed that Laval was able to reassess a situation at a moment's notice and
embrace a new altemative. 279
Not unnaturally the two statesmen rapidly developed an affinity. After all, Laval
never shared in the virulent nationalism or the anti-German passion of some of his
compatriots. And Bruning had nothing in common with the caricature of a screaming
bloodthirsty Hun: he exuded honesty and moderation. His command of the French
language could only ease the free exchange of ideas.
Nevertheless, affinity, even friendship, did not mean the surrender of their
respective goals. Brilning aimed to bring an end to reparations and the Versailles treaty.
Laval would persist with the idea of the political moratorium. Still, they did find
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common purpose in the notion of economic cooperation. 280 The hour and a half
conversation ended with a note on the upcoming February disarmament conference.
By refusing the French loan,Briining removed all means of French pressure,
essentially putting France and Germany on equal footing. 281 This did nothing to ease the
talks later that afternoon.
Briining recalled, "The circle grew. Curtius and Briand entered, followed by
Flandin, Pietri, Berthelot and briefly Champetier de Ribes. "282 They developed the
themes of the previous conversation, again. Briining did not go into detail but apparently
Laval had to temper Flandin's undiplomatic sallies. Briining was, however, able to
explain his position to the other participants during a brief absence of Flandin. 283
The ten-year moratorium was discussed again and more of the French demands
were brought out such as: German disarmament or armament freeze, dissolution of the
Stahlhelm and interdiction of nationalistic propaganda in the Universities. 284 The German
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delegation protested that they could not possibly agree to "a temporary sacrifice of their
legal rights." 285 To the relief of Briining, Laval agreed with him and open to true FrancoGerman understanding. Unfortunately Laval was frequently called away to talk on the
phone. Briining surmised it was Tardieu, for every time Laval returned more determined
and less amenable. 286
In the face of these new difficulties Bruning is believed to have said: "Will the
same tragedy always exist between our two countries? Will we never be able to
pronounce the same words and make the same gestures at the same time?" 287 Moved by
the words of the Chancellor, Laval declared that he could not "dishonor the head of the
German Government" by forcing demands upon Germany. 288 Laval put an end to the
moratorium discussions that day. 289
Flandin stated openly that as finance minister he thought the London conference
useless and that he would not go. It took the combined influences of Laval and Briand to
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convince Flandin to postpone such decision until the next day. 290 At some point that day
Laval had already specified publicly that he would go to London. 291
After a quiet dinner at the German Embassy, the exhausted Briining, Curtius, and
Billow went for a stroll on the Champs Elysees. At ten thirty that evening, at the
invitation of Edge, the Germans went to the American Embassy to talk with Mellon and
Stimson. 292
Briining found Edge frosty and Mellon lukewarm. Stimson fortunately was
friendly and they engaged in financial talks. On the whole, Briining felt that the
conversation was unfruitful and at 1:00 a.m. Edge broke up the meeting. 293 Stimson and
Edge had a more positive outlook of the evening. They were able to determine that
Germany needed about 400 million (the currency was not specified but we can assume
that they talked in dollars) of credit to make "Germany go." Stimson thought that "the
whole talk was searching, thorough, frank, but entirely friendly and left us with a good
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deal ofrespect for Bruening."294 Bruning apparently misjudged Edge's attitude, for the
American ambassador in his memoirs spoke highly of the Chancellor.295
Laval's invitation to have breakfast at his home with Madame Laval particularly
touched Bruning. 296 At eight in the morning, Bruning, a Catholic himself, had been
invited, perhaps by Champetier de Ribes who was also present, to celebrate a mass for
peace at Notre Dame de la Victoire. Brilning's action was not appreciated in Germany. 297
At half past ten the French and Germans met again. This time they were joined
by Henderson, Tyrrell, Stimson, Edge, Italian Foreign Minister Dino Grandi, Belgium
Prime Minister J. Renkin, Belgium Foreign Minister Paul H. Hymans, Belgian Emile
Francqui, architect of the BIS, and the Japanese Ambassador Kenkichi Yoshisawa. 298
Flandin, his usual undiplomatic self, greeted Bruning by announcing that he would not go
to London without German political concessions. The group gathered in Laval's office at
the interior ministry. Italy, Belgium and Japan said the habitual diplomatic niceties but
offered nothing tangible. 299 Laval and Flandin resumed their tug-of-war. This did not
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bode well for the London conference. Fortunately Briand awoke from an uremia induced
slumber and expanded the scope of the discussion to the world crisis. Bruning was able
to expose his fear of a Bolshevik takeover if a solution was not found to the present crisis
and to emphasize the importance of French participation in the London conference. 300
Apparently this was enough to win over Flandin, for the French did partake in the
London conference. The meeting was closed by a dinner at the French foreign ministry.
Stimson and Henderson did not attend for they had already departed for London that
aftemoon. 301
Preparation of the Communique for the newsreels proved difficult, but eventually
Briand was able to smooth things over. 302 The joint declaration stated that they were "in
agreement in the recognition of the importance of this encounter" and that it affirmed the
"beginning of a trusting collaboration."303
During the gala dinner at the Quai d'Orsay, Bruning talked with Caillaux. Briand
also gave Bruning the task of winning over Herriot. Though Herriot remained opposed to
any alleviation of the reparation problem, the friendly exchange boded well.
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A spectacular Franco-German reconciliation was not to be, but Laval and Brilning
understood and appreciated each other's difficulties.

In a letter he wrote to Chambrun

after the war, Bruning recalled Laval's honesty toward him and Laval's true appreciation
of the Nazi threat. 304 If Bruning had not gained any major French concessions, The
French had received him with dignity, which in itself was an accomplishment.

C. The London Conference of Experts
On the morning of 20 July 1931 all the parties to the earlier meetings who had not
left already took the train for Boulogne. While Brilning and Curtius were boarding the
train, Laval appeared and invited them to join him in the French government saloon
carriage. Already present in the Pullman car were Briand, Flandin, Pietri, Berthelot and
the Belgian Foreign Minister Paul H. Hymans. Brilning immediately directed Curtius to
talk with the Belgian. Onlookers on board a commuter train and on the quay, convinced
that the Franco-German reconciliation was imminent, cheered Briand on. Laval, Briand
and Brilning conversed over the fate of Europe for over an hour and a half. As the train
ran through the valley of the Eure, Briand poetically remarked about how the Americans
and the Russians, unlike the Europeans, did not have hills to limit their ambitions: "I fear
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the people of the steppes and of the prairies, and I apprehend to see our poor old Europe
crushed between them. "305
Berthelot, the Quai d'Orsay secretary, sat next to Bruning pretending to read
documents. Each time Laval or Briand tended to agree with Briining's vision on current
affairs, Berthelot would join in and redirect the conversation. 306 On board the ferry,
Briining sought respite from the traveling and the negotiating. He pretended not to have
his sea legs and took a nap in his cabin. 307 On the train from Dover to London, the French
and the Germans discussed the schedule of the conference. Dr. Hans Schaffer of the
finance ministry and Dr. Herman Schmitz of the giant chemical conglomerate IG Farben,
met the Germans at the London train station. 308
Even though the British had called the meeting, they had no solution for what
ailed Germany and the world economy. The London conference started on the afternoon
of 20 July. Similar conferences had been held in 1923 and 1929.309 Seven countries were
present: Great Britain, France, the United States, Japan, Italy, Belgium, and Germany.
The colloquium opened with the "usual unimportant speeches." 310 France and Germany
305
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reaffirmed "their desire for collaboration and confidence between the two countries." 311
Stimson was particularly pleased with Laval's "very temperate [and]-good statement full
of good feelings toward Germany."312 Laval's friendliness did much to extinguish the
hostility unleashed by the French press against Britain and America. 313
It was not until later that day that the conference truly began when more intimate

groups formed to discuss the matters at hand. Bruning, supported by Schmitz and Dr.
Vocke, a director of the Reichsbank, attempted to convince Flandin of the benefit of a
purely commercial loan of 500 million marks guaranteed by German industry. 314 This
conversation, referred to in the British documents as the Committee of Finance Ministers
was chaired by MacDonald. 315 In the meantime, Curtius and Billow discussed with
Henderson and Vansittart, the issues of the pocket battleships and the Zollunion. 316
The next morning at 10:00 o'clock, the French, the Germans and the English met
at the Treasury. Snowden, at the instigation of Bruning, proposed the cancellation of the
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debt. Mellon, echoed by the French, protested the suggestion. 317 Stimson's and
MacDonald's objectives were twofold. First, they wanted to help stabilize Germany's
short-temi credit, second they wanted to convince Germany and the other conference
participants that loans were not the answer. Neither Stimson nor MacDonald offered an
indication as to how the short term credit should be stabilized. As to their reluctance to
offer a guaranteed government loan to Germany, that was directed by President Hoover
on the one hand and Bank of England Governor Norman on the other. 318 At 4:00 p.m.
Stimson met with Curtius to examine the possibility of Stimson's visit to Berlin and
halting the construction of pocket battleships, in particular the Deutschland. 319
On Wednesday the situation worsened for the Germans in London. Back home,
the Reichstag was in turmoil. In Briining's absence, the ministry of agriculture had
imposed a new export tax, and in protest the tax collection agencies were flooded with
worthless checks from the bankrupt Danat. 320 Bruning even received a hate-filled
telegram from Hugenberg and Hitler. 321 Bruning had given the impression that the
finances of Germany were under control. The conference participants now confronted
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him with pointed questions regarding Germany's foreign exchange. Brilning faced the
barrage of questions alone. Vocke, who wanted to speak in the defense of the
beleaguered Reichsbank, collapsed in utter frustration. Billow discreetly urged Brilning
not to run the conference by himself and let the German experts talk. Schaffer and
Schmitz were able to explain the situation of the Reichsbank. 322
The Committee of Finance Ministers was encountering difficulties in coming to
any sort of agreement. Gold outflow from the Bank of England had Snowden on
tenterhooks. To make matters worse, he believed the uncomfortable financial situation
was the deliberate work of the French government. 323 As mentioned above, France
frequently used money as a political and diplomatic tool: in this instance, though, the
franc rose in relation to the pound -- as did the dollar -- the French government, according
to economist Barry Eichengreen, was not implicated. 324 Laval needed Britain's finances
to remain solid to back the German economy and preserve the diplomatic gains in
Franco-German relations. The rush on British gold stemmed from the commercial banks
of Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, "which having lost liquidity
through the blocking of German credits, sold sterling to increase their gold reserves." 325
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One of the items that Stimson and Mellon wanted to implement was the
"rediscounting of certain commercial paper held by the Reichsbank [and] by the central
banks of various countries." This proposition, however, met with the opposition of the
Federal Reserve Bank, and Hoover would not pressure the Fed. 326 Had the Federal
Reserve not opposed this idea, it would have been taken out by Snowden: the distraught
Chancellor of the Exchequer attempted scrap the entire proposal. Stimson intervened and
with the help of Laval and Flandin offered an alternate solution to the rediscounting; the
conference was put back on track. In his Diary Stimson did not specify what this solution
was. 327 The Committee of Finance Ministers came up with a declaration that met the
following day with the approval of the conference at large. It stated that the "lack of
confidence [was] not justified by the economic and budgetary situation" of Germany.
The conference participants agreed, as far as was "within their power, to restore
confidence" and to maintain credit already extended to Germany. A BIS loan of one
hundred million dollars was renewed for an additional three months to stabilize the short
term credit crisis. 328 The participants further agreed to create a commission to study the
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credit situation in Germany. 329 In effect, the conference agreed to do very little. They
hoped that their display of goodwill alone would do much to redress the situation.
At the conclusion of the conference, the Germans received the French at their
embassy. Though Briand had slept through most of the conference and never read a
book, Brilning was amazed at how knowledgeable the old diplomat was on international
finances. 330 A garden party at Buckingham Palace hosted by King George V, Queen
Mary, followed the conference. Bruning found the royal family "charming."331 Stimson
discussed the situation of South America with the Prince of Wales. 332 The reception for
the foreign press ensued.
To close the day, Brilning invited Stimson, Mellon and Hugh Gibson, the
American ambassador in Brussels, for dinner at the Carlton Hotel. Brilning hoped that
the recent events in Germany would at least shake America from its isolationism.
Briining and Stimson came to talk about their mutual World War I experience and found
out that they fought each other in Bourlon (near Bapaume). 333 Delighted by their near
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encounter, Stimson, according to Bruning, worked to obtain from Mellon a productive
loan for his "friend" Bruning. Within a half-hour, Mellon agreed to lend nearly half a
billion marks for the purchase of cotton, copper, wheat and silver. 334 This portion of the
conversation was not reported by Stimson in his Diary. Instead Stimson stated that a
"fool story" from the Associated Press reported that a loan was made between him and
Bri.ining but that "nothing like that took place."335 At half past eleven Stimson called up a
press conference for the American journalists and talked with relish ofBriining's and his
battle in the woods ofBourlon. 336
On the morning of Friday, 24 June 1931, Laval met with Stimson, and the two
discussed the events of the last days. The French Ambassador in London, Aime Fleuriau,
joined in towards the end of the conversation and helped Stimson with his French. Laval
expressed his "warm appreciation" for Stimson's visit in Paris and how encouraged he
was by his conversations with Briining. They discussed the Polish Corridor and how
Laval thought it was the sole obstacle to improved Franco-German relations.

Stimson

mentioned the necessity of a naval agreement between France and Italy. They discussed
Mussolini and how they thought, not withstanding the military blustering, that Mussolini
wanted peace. Laval brought up the financial situation of Britain and how he intended to
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pressure the French banks to stop their withdrawals of gold. They parted on excellent
terms. Laval hoped that Stimson would be able to come to Paris again before leaving for
America, for he felt that in the chaos of the last few days he had not received him in
proper fashion. 337
That same Friday, the Germans and the French left London together. On board the
vessel Canterbury, Laval and Bruning were able to converse some more about the
possibilities of a French visit to Germany. 338 Laval took the opportunity to introduce
Andre Fran9ois-Poncet as an expert in finance and foreign affairs in general and in
"Briand-diplomacy" in particular. In an intimate conversation with Briining, Laval asked
what he thought of replacing the French Ambassador in Berlin, Pierre de Margerie, with
Fran9ois-Poncet. 339 Laval thought Fran9ois-Poncet an ideal choice, to represent and
foster the new found Franco-German understanding. 340 Briining recognized the high
qualities of Fran9ois-Poncet but did not think him quite suitable for the task. Bruning
preferred Margery who was of the "old school," but would not oppose the wishes of the
French govemment. 341 Andre Fran9ois-Poncet, the under-secretary to the Premier, would
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become the ambassador to Berlin. 342 In Calais, Laval and Bruning biade each other
farewell. Briand had returned to France by way of Boulogne to meet up with some old
friends. 343
Stimson pursued his European tour to Berlin. He had always had a poor opinion
of Germany. In 1870 in Berlin, he had seen his pregnant mother knocked of a sidewalk
by a drunk saber-rattling German officer on horseback, causing the immediate leave of
Stimson's father for Paris. This initial impression had only been worsened by the War.
But Briining was able to show him a gentler Germany. Briining reassured the American
secretary of state that the end of reparations would not mean massive rearmaments in
Germany. They left each other on excellent terms. Stimson promised to return to Berlin
in six months to discuss disarmament. 344 Stimson also talked with Hans Luther, president
of the Reichsbank, of the need for Germany to show "courage and self-help," adding
"that bankers would not loan money to a man who said he was broke."345 Stimson had
similar talks with Dr. Adam Stegerwald, the German labor minister, whom Stimson
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dubbed a "weak sister."346 Stimson met with Hindenburg before flying to Amsterdam
where he had dinner with members of the Dutch government before crossing over to
England. 347
On 28 July, MacDonald and Henderson made a goodwill visit to Berlin. 348 They
discussed disarmament, the overall financial situation, and especially the English gold
losses. Bruning was convinced, incorrectly, that the French were exerting financial
pressure on the British to alter their policy. 349

D. The collapse of the pound sterling
and the forsaking of the Gold Standard
Without a doubt the British were under enormous pressure. Britain's rate of
unemployment was a constant concern with roughly 2.5 million jobless in 1931. 350 As
the world crisis developed, new factors came into play: trade and tourism dropped by
£ 10 million each from 1930 to 1931, revenue from financial transactions fell by £25
million, and more than £60 million in interest, profits and dividends were lost. The latter
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stemmed in large part from the financial collapse of South America which had already
cost Britain £40 million the previous year. The crisis in Germany, Austria, and Hungary
froze over £75 million of British deposits in these countries. 351 As mentioned above,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland had assets blocked in Germany as
well and sought to balance their losses by trading in their pound sterling for gold at a
moment that Great Britain could least afford it.
Laval was still in London when he was approached to relieve the Bank of
England. In the name of solidarity, Laval had the Banque de France purchase £50
million. The pound was under attack; it was only a matter of time before another
catastrophe would send the British currency tumbling. 352 In August after drastic budget
cuts and tax hikes Great Britain was able to borrow $200 million from J.P. Morgan & Co.
with a matching loan from Paris. 353
The catastrophe came in September. On 18 September in the middle of the night,
in the absence of Ambassador Tyrrell, Charge d' Affaires Ronald Campbell called Laval
at home. Campbell requested a meeting to be held right away. Laval agreed, and they
met at the ministry of the interior, Place Beauvau. Campbell explained that the Bank of
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England was in dire straits. 354 In two months two hundred million pounds in gold had
been withdrawn. At this rate in a few days the Bank of England would have to cease to
honor its payment in gold. According to the British, President Hoover had already
declined to offer assistance because Congress held the purse strings. 355 Laval promised to
help. Campbell was moved to tears and said: "Mr. President, my country will never
forget. 11356
Laval immediately contacted the Banque de France. The French vaults were
already stacked with British paper. With much reluctance the Banque de France opened a
credit of three billion francs in gold. 357 Campbell transmitted to Laval the British
government's appreciation. 358
Three days later, without even a courtesy warning to Laval the British government
abandoned the gold standard and devaluated the pound by 40 percent, the French were
left with depreciated paper pounds. London being one of the largest international
financial centers, the world followed the British example. The gold standard was only
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maintained by a handful of nations: France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy,
Poland, South Africa and the United States. 359
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CHAPTER

v
A CHANCE FOR RECONCILIATION IN BERLIN

In the Summer of 1931, Briand was still at the helm of the Foreign Ministry but
because of his illness not always in full control. Berthelot began to define his own
foreign policy, hiding behind the authority that befell him as Briand's right-hand man. In
collaboration with the radical Edouard Herriot, Berthelot engaged in talks with Soviet
Ambassador Valerian Dovgalevski. 360 The Soviet Union was not Laval's immediate
concern: Germany and the United States were.
The first encounter in Paris between Laval and Brilning had been a positive step,
albeit a small one. The dividends of a true reconciliation between France and Germany
would be tremendous. The fire would be taken out of the nationalists both in France and
in Germany. It would put hope in the heart of Germans and Frenchman alike.

A. Invitation
On 15 August 1931 Leopold von Boesch, the German ambassador in Paris,
officially invited Laval and Briand to come to Berlin. 361 Half a century had passed since
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French minister William Henri Waddington had been in Germany to-sign the Berlin
treaty of 1878. 362
The Frenchmen accepted the invitation. Briand unfortunately was so sick that he
could not go immediately. Bruning was tom between relief -- because he feared protests
from the Nazis, Stahlhelms or the Communists, all equally opposed to the Diktat of
Versailles -- and disappointment. The chancery even thought it might be a "diplomatic
disease. "363 Breaching protocol once again, Laval called Bruning on the phone. He
promised his German counterpart that Briand wanted and would come as soon as possible
to save peace. In a matter of minutes, Laval solved what would have taken days and
numerous dispatches through the regular channels. While he had Bruning on the phone,
Laval also read him passages of a speech he was about to give at the national assembly
and that might be offensive to the Germans. 364
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B. The threat of demonstrations
Reassured that his guest would come, Briining addressed his key concern
regarding the visit: demonstrations. The situation in Germany was catastrophic.
Government payroll was met with the greatest difficulties, private bankruptcies occurred
in regular succession, hoarding was endemic and met with the blocking of accounts, and
purchasing power was declining. All these ailments had a dreadful impact on the German
moral, and the extremes exploited this. 365 Yet the talks could not be sullied by the Nazis.
Briining let the Nazis know that any disruption would be severely dealt with.
What helped Briining most was that Dr. Josef Goebbels, the SA Gauleiter for Berlin, had
his hands full. The recent beatings of Jews Goebbels had ordered along the

Kurfurstendamm on the Jewish New Year had resulted in the arrest of his two
lieutenants. 366 Furthermore, Hitler was engaged in a seduction campaign of the German
elite. 367 Violent demonstrations against foreign dignitaries did not fit in such perspective.
Since Walter Stennes, who had contested Hitler's leadership, had been replaced in April
by Ernst Rohm as head of the SA, the SA were for the time being sufficiently compliant
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to bend to the will of the political wing of the NSDAP. 368 Also talk of a visit by Laval to
the United States showed that France was not isolated from the other major powers as
some in Germany liked to believe. 369 Brilning's government and France's representatives
would not to be embarrassed.

Briand & Laval on the train to Berlin
courtesy Rene de Chambrun

On 27 September 1931, the German government grandly received Premier Laval
and minister Briand. Present in the French delegation were Berthelot and Alexis Leger. 370
The Friedrichstraj3e train station was decked out in the French and German colors, and
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little girls greeted the visitors bearing wild flowers. 371 Instead of the dreaded SA,
Secretary of State Dr. Robert Weismann lined the streets leading to the Hotel Adlon with
plain clothed policemen who cheered the foreign visitors. 372 The German police proved
to be very effective in averting disruption, and no incidents occurred. 373 Briand, who
must have guessed what Bruning had to do to avert troubles, greeted heartily the
Chancellor with: "Ah, there is the young man who learns his craft better and better!" 374

C. Hindenburg
President Paul von Hindenburg, the revered World War I Field Marshal, received
the French delegation in a formal setting. Despite his mixed feelings toward the Weimar
Republic, Hindenburg performed his task adequately. The conversation was mundane,
save for an unexpected quip reported by Andre Frani;ois-Poncet the new French
ambassador in Berlin. Pointing to an exhausted Briand, the Reich president whispered to
Frani;ois-Poncet: "The journey must have been very tiresome for that old gentleman." 375
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Hindenburg repeated his concern to his State Secretary Otto MeiBner. 376 The victor of
Tannenberg was then eighty-four, Briand only sixty-nine. 377

Laval & Briand (Franr;ois-Poncet in Back) leaving Hindenburg's palace
L 'Illustration, 10 October 1931
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D. "Vive Briand"
The poor health of Briand was obviuos to all: He collapsed at the side of Mrs.
Curtius, he dozed during speeches, and fell asleep in the car while driving with Curtius.
The shouts of" Vive Briand'' and "Vive la paix" (long live peace) balmed the old
diplomat's heart as he turned to Laval and said: "Ils m'ont compris" (they understood
me). 378 Of course the German who shouted "Frieden! Nie wieder Krieg" (Peace! War
never again) demanded great concessions from France on the Versailles Treaty and on the
Reparations. Biographer Bernard Oudin described Briand as consumed by the ephemeral
moment of glory, not knowing or not wanting to know. 379 The popularity of Briand was
great among German pacifists. His efforts to reconcile France and Germany had not been
forgotten. On 28 September, while the French delegation was dining at the French
embassy a crowd of Germans shouted "Briand, retten Sie uns!" (save us!) which,
according to journalist Lambel, deeply touched the old minister. 38° Fran9ois-Poncet
reports the same incident somewhat differently: "Suddenly a cry rose, uttered in French.
We thought we understood what the purport was: 'Sauvez-nous! Save us!' But Briand,
whose ear was still keen and whose mind was still shrewd, set us right. 'No' he explained.
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That voice said: 'Sauvez-vous! Get out ofhere!"' 381 It is possible that Lambe! did not
think it would be good copy to have the foreign minister cracking jokes. Kidding
notwithstanding, this diplomatic voyage would be Briand's last.

E. Laval and Bruning
The two-day conference had been thoroughly prepared in advance. Laval and
Briining were well aware that public opinion in their respective nations had to be nudged
gently on the path of reconciliation. They had agreed not to talk in public about the great
concessions such as the repudiation of Versailles, and the resolution of the war
reparations and debts. 382
The two premiers, free from any onlookers, met for an hour in the library of the
Hotel Ad/on. Bruning, who had to swallow the rejection of the Zollunion by the
International Court of The Hague fifteen days earlier, did not have the energy to endure
another offensive from the right. Laval, whose freedom of movement was hindered as
well, could only concur. Bruning, exhausted by many months of nonstop crisis,
demanded to know whether the French politicians would prefer to do deal with
"Hugenberg, Hitler, or Schacht." If so, he would gladly step aside. Laval urged Briining
to remain steadfast. Laval knew that only Briining and he were capable of bringing
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France and Germany together. Laval added that Madame Laval, whom Briining had met
in Paris, shared in this intimate belief. 383
This confidence reassured Briining, yet he was puzzled to hear that Laval, invited
by Hoover, did not wish him to go to Washington at the same time. But this did not
overly concern Bruning, as he trusted in his new found friendship with Stimson and
Mellon. Besides, he had not yet been invited to America. 384 Furthermore, Briining was
convinced that "Laval wanted a fair understanding with Germany." Not any Germany,
but as Stimson qualified it, "the Germany of Dr. Briining." 385 The two heads of
government agreed to keep each other well informed by telephone of the developments in
each other's countries, and to make every effort to improve Franco-German relations. 386
To the German press Laval spoke of restoring the trust between the two nations,
candidly acknowledging that some of the more controversial items were not on the
agenda. Instead, in the face of "crisis without precedents," an economic cooperation had
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been deemed the best solution. 387 Laval concluded: "The entente has to realize itself, for
through it will come salvation." 388 The official communique stated:
The representatives of the German and French governments hope[d] in this
fashion to have laid the foundation of a constructive work open to all, a
first step in a global effort responding to the needs of the moment. 389
A substantial portion of the stay was dedicated to official ceremonies and
symbolic gestures designed to lay the bases of the Franco-German friendship in the mind
of public opinion of both nations. After the conference Laval, Bruning, Briand, and
Curtius held a reception for various French and German delegations. Laval and Bruning
visited the Pergamon museum and the Zoo while Briand went to the grave of Stresemann
and paid his respects to the widow. The whole trip was punctuated by excellent photo
opportunities of the four statesmen dining, drinking and conversing together. 390
Brtining and Curtius did their utmost to make the visit of the Frenchmen as
pleasant as possible. Curtius recalled:
Especially enjoyed, on the second day, was the trip on the Havel in
beautiful weather. It was a delight to see with what appetite both
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gentlemen [Laval and Briand] ate heartily of the pike-perch with butter
and new potatoes and the pheasant with sauerkraut[ ... ]. 391

M1't Curtius. Bruning, Laval et Briand tfovant leurs verres <le biere.
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However much Laval enjoyed the pheasant with sauerkraut, according to
Fran9ois-Poncet, he was still very disappointed not to have "been served frankfurters and
sauerkraut at any of the official banquets." So on the last evening after the dinner at the
embassy Laval ordered the coveted dish to share with his associates. For Laval, who
always had a delicate stomach, this resulted in acute indigestion. He tried to walk off his
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queasiness by going "up and down Unter den Linden -- to the discomfort of the sentries
detailed to do him appropriate honors, for every time Laval passed, the guard of honor
had to present arms. "392
Upon their return Briand and Laval were welcomed at the train station by
thousands of war veterans and "gueules cassees" as well as the entire cabinet. When they
got into their cars, Tardieu's vehicle was assailed by a group of communists. Fortunately
Laval's very own security team formed of the furniture movers and other strong arms
from Aubervilliers dispersed the spoilsports. 393

F. The Franco-German commission
The Franco-German commission was established to help in developing the
existing economic ties between the two countries and creating new ones. The French had
the funds and the Germans the industrial might and know-how. The Germans even
proposed a customs union, but it would be too much to the advantage of Germany
because of her enormous industrial output and her devalued currency. 394
No doubt the commission was a far cry from lofty pacts to outlaw war. The
popular impact was not comparable. Laval simply tried to tackle the world problems at
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their root. By preserving and enhancing the well being of the citizen one inhibits the
need for emigration, revolution, or war. This was Laval's equivalent of the American
"pursuit of happiness. "395
Laval named his economist Claude-Joseph Gignoux as the French representative
to the commission. The Premier took the project very much to heart, even chairing the
commission when itmet in Paris. Within a few months agricultural and industrial
agreements were put together. Projects of collaboration in air transports were on the
drawing board. 396
The Franco-German Commission was modest in scope but was only intended to
be the beginning of a larger diplomatic endeavor which would take Laval to America.
All Laval and Bruning needed was good will and time.
Unhappily these commodities were scarce in Germany. France's new ambassador
to Berlin wrote:
The very day after the Laval-Briand visit the hopes and illusions which
had brought me to Germany began falling away one by one, as so many
leaves off a tree in autumn. The cause of Franco-German amity met with
no sympathy brave enough to declare itself either in Berlin or in the
Country at Large. Only a few newspapers, the Berliner Tageblatt for
instance, dared openly uphold it. The new Economic commission and its
subcommissions pursued their task amid general indifference. 397
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Briining's position had been uncomfortable from his first day in office. He would
discover that the military tapped his phone line, that strangers listened in on his
conversations through the flue of his chimney, that his office was searched, and, worst of
all, that important documents were secretly duplicated. The text of conversations and
documents found their way either to the press (Vossische Zeitung), the Nazis or both. 398
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CHAPTER

VI
COMING TO AMERICA

A. American Isolationism circumvented
President Hoover was well aware that American public opinion, and especially his
party in the United States Senate, were staunchly isolationist. The president's personal
beliefs might have been otherwise: Indeed his orchestration of American relief for
Belgium during World War I and his later endowment of the Hoover Institution on War,
Revolution and Peace at Stanford University showed a man with keen interest in
international matters. The Hoover Moratorium itself, however flawed, demonstrated a
grasp of world affairs. Yet Hoover had remained a conscientious Republican deferring to
the isolationists led by of Borah ofldaho. Hoover would never on his own accord have
invited the French Premier so soon after the debacle of the Hoover Moratorium. 399 Not
all Americans, however, thought like Hoover or Borah.
On 18 September, a week before Laval's departure for Berlin, James G.
McDonald, Chairman of the Foreign Policy Association, stirred the Franco-American
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relations. 400 McDonald, with the help of journalist Comte Femand de Brinon, of the
evening financial organ L 'Information, arranged a meeting with Premier Laval. De
Brinon was also Laval's confidential advisor on foreign affairs. 401 During the
conversation MacDonald suggested that Laval should visit with Hoover. De Brinon
discussed in his article the benefits of personal contacts between the heads of state. He
cited the meeting of President Hoover and Premier MacDonald, and that of Briining and
Laval and deemed a Hoover-Laval acquaintance the logical next step. 402 Ambassador
Edge who had been sounded out privately rapidly contacted Secretary Stimson before the
article was put to press. 403
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B. Invitation
Laval could not have planned it any better himself. A meeting with Hoover was
an idea that perfectly suited his diplomatic style. The French public welcomed the idea of
a visit to America. Laval could not show too great enthusiasm of course; Hoover could
reject the concept. He let it be known, however, that his government was not opposed to
the idea. On 19 September, Edge sent another cable reporting the article and the French
enthusiasm.404 It was up to the Hoover administration to extend an invitation to the
French government. Stimson reacted rapidly and that same day sent a positive response
in the hopes of coordinating it with the celebration of the Battle of Yorktown. 405 During
his stay in Europe that summer Stimson "had formed a high opinion of Laval. 11406
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C. Preparing the encounter
Laval naturally reacted favorably. He had to wait of course for the approval of his
cabinet and the Chamber of Deputies but on the 21 September 1931 he had already taken
several steps to show his willingness to talk with President Hoover. He telephoned Edge
to let him know that he had conferred with Doumer who advised him to "go to the United
States. 11407 Laval also issued a statement to the press in which he expressed the
satisfaction of French public opinion with the invitation. 408 Laval contacted Director of
the United Press Association in France Ralph E. Heinzen, and an old friend, to arrange a
press interview. 409 Heinzen, accompanied by journalist Karl Bickel, conferred with
Laval that same evening. Bickel wrote:
Personally I was tremendously and favorably struck with Laval,
particularly so because I had gained a rather different idea of him prior to
his visit. I have met most of the French leaders of the past six or eight
years. This chap is really different. While he is essentially French in
appearance, short, dark, very mobile expressive face, which his
photographs do not indicate, with particular fine eyes, the dominant strain
ofNorman [sic] blood in him, gives him almost an American or English
directness and frankness in his conversation. 410
During this discussion Laval laid out what he intended to discuss with Hoover so that
Heinzen and Bickel could pass it on to the president. The use of this unofficial channel
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was necessary because the voyage had not yet been approved. It was designed to offer
Hoover a view freed from official diplomatic burden. Laval was, as always, building the
bases of a personal rapport. In addition, the recent anti-American feelings caused by the
moratorium would have bridled any communication through the normal channels of the
Quai d'Orsay. Laval deemed the trip to the United States essential to avoid "surprises"
like the moratorium in the future. 411 Laval hoped to talk about two great problems:
reparations as a cause of trouble in Europe, and disarmament in anticipation of the
Geneva conference to be held on the subject. Laval spoke of a partial reduction of
reparations but could not for economic reasons allow an unrestricted abolition of the
payments. For example, the profits of the German railroads served to pay reparations. If
the railroads were released of this burden "they could then carry freight at very low cost [
... ] [and] dump coal [and] other materials into France and ruin certain of [ ... ] [the
French] industries. "412 On the subject of disarmament, Laval felt that Hoover was "the
most sincere and the most serious. "413 In this, Laval felt that Hoover differed from
Mussolini and MacDonald who called for disarmament as well. The former could not
afford a larger army, and the latter had difficulties meeting the cost of the British fleet.
Laval wanted to be able to explain the French position on disarmament to come to an
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agreement and give Geneva a good chance of success. On a personal note, Laval
mentioned he would like to take advantage of his stay in America to have a glance at the
cattle operations in Chicago, an area of particular interest to him because of his own
farms. On the whole he did not wish to accept any engagements save the governmental
ones, as he was not fond of ceremonies and honors. 414 Also, Laval most certainly did not
want the talks to be sidetracked or, worse, lost in the fanfare.
Ambassador Edge extended the official invitation to Laval and Briand on 25
September 1931 after the French Council of Ministers unanimously approved Laval's
visit to the United States. 415 This was also the opportunity for Edge and Mellon to offer,
on behalf of the United States, "silver inkstands in the eighteenth century American
Colonial style appropriately engraved" to the participants of the moratorium talks, an
elegant gesture which was well received by the French press as was the invitation itsel£ 416
Gabriel Perreux of Paris Midi was simply elated, hoping that this marked the beginning
of the end of American isolationism. It was he wrote, an opportunity for Laval "to
inscribe his name next to Clemenceau, Poincare, and Briand on the frontispiece of the
temple of great Statesmen." 417
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Laval and Briand had both been invited. "M. Laval was most anxious that
Foreign Minister Briand be in his party, but the aged statesman demurred, claiming that
the voyage was too long and too arduous for one of his years." 418 Later, French
Ambassador Paul Claude! reported to Stimson that Briand was "peeved because Laval is
coming without him." 419 However, contradictory, both statements might have been
correct considering Briand's illness. More likely this was yet another rumor started by
Briand's entourage at the Quai.
Laval prepared thoroughly for his journey. Capable of improvising a good
speech from a few notes, he now studied the financial files with his team of experts:
Fran9ois Albert-Buisson, Judge at the Court of Commerce; Charles Rist, former subgovernor of the Banque de France; and finance inspectors Rueff, Boissard, and Henry
Bizot. 420 Heinzen and the Mayor of Versailles Henry Haye, were his consultants on
American society. Laval handpicked the team that was going to accompany him. 421
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In addition to these financial experts, the foreign ministry's legal consultant, Jules
Basdevant, the naval specialist Louis Aubert, and a former official of the finance
ministry, Jean Parmentier, would accompany Laval. 422 Laval also invited Marriner, the
American embassy counselor, and Pell, Edges's personal secretary and translator. Laval
had appreciated their efforts during Stimson's visit and thought that they would like to see
their families. 423 Laval's generosity caused some embarrassment to the American State
Department. Inviting the two embassy staffs was one thing, but paying their way was
quite another. This matter of protocol generated a few dispatches between Washington
and the American Embassy.
Laval was well aware that general American sentiments vis-a-vis France were
unfavorable as she was blamed for the chaos in Europe, especially in the Hearst press. 424
In the weeks preceding Laval's voyage, the French press, namely the well respected Le

Temps, started the rumor that the United States was about to abandon the gold standard.
This of course caused a run on the dollar, infuriating Hoover. 425 It was suggested that Le

Temps yielded to French ammunition manufacturers as they did not look kindly on
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possible talks of disarmament. The Laval government had to pressure the Banque de
France not to liquidate its dollars. 426 The American press of course was justified, this
time, in accusing the French of wrongdoing.
Yet Laval aimed to charm the American public. He acquired elegant formal attire,
complete with top hat. On board the Ile-de-France, he practiced for American style press
interviews with a rolling barrage of questions. He had a trump card in the person of his
beloved daughter Josee, who had just turned twenty. Her smile, for she was lovely,
would do marvels in New York. Jeanne Laval was not fond of social happenings,
therefore "it was her delight -- and his [Pierre Laval's] -- to see their brilliant daughter
accompany him on the journeys abroad [ ... ]." 427 Raymond and Jacqueline Patenotre,
friends of Pierre and Josee, were also on board the steamer. 428 Raymond Patenotre was a
member of the national assembly and a press baron with precious American connections.

D. Le Havre-New York
Pierre and Josee Laval, the Premier's entourage, and a plethora of journalists
boarded the Ile-de-France at Le Havre on 16 October 1931. Laval was careful to temper
the extravagant enthusiasm engendered by the trip. He cautioned that if "frank
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explanations between heads of state appear as the surest method to reclaim the rules of a
normal economy, it would be excessive to expect definitive solutions." 429
The journey was divided between work and leisure where Laval was seen
participating in the life and games of the ship. The Ile-de-France reached New York on
22 October. Stimson had travelled to New York to welcome the French delegation.
Johnny Walker, the flamboyant mayor ofNew York, grandly received Laval. In the early
morning, Laval and Heinzen strolled Broadway, and visited the subway incognito. To
the press who asked him what he thought of America he answered: "if I were twenty
again, I would come and live here ... "430 At New York's City Hall after the welcoming
words of Johnny Walker; Laval pronounced his first speech in America to "the great
American people." 431
Laval spoke of his "pilgrimage among the capitals," explaining that unusual times
required unusual diplomatic means. In response to the American press's criticism of
France's position vis-a-vis Germany in particular and on disarmament in general, he
clearly stated France's desire for peace albeit without compromising her security. 432 He
noted the American people's aspiration for "self-containment," but appealed to the
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"generous impulse" and "noble idealism" of the American people to "respond if necessary
to calls which may reach them from the old world. "433
On that busy morning Josee Laval inaugurated the Empire State building by
symbolically lighting the Statue of Liberty from the one-hundredth floor of the new
skyscraper. Unknown to her, in the crowd cheering Pierre Laval was also her future
husband Rene de Chambrum, a young French lawyer, who was captivated not so much by
Pierre Laval as by his daughter's radiant smile and sky blue beret. The definitive
encounter between Rene and Josee would not occur, however, until some three years later
at a dinner at the home of the Patenotres. 434
The first leg of the American journey ended with the picture of Pierre Laval
triumphantly riding down Broadway Avenue in a convertible under a shower of ticker
tape. 435 The ice was broken; Laval charmed the press. Yet the difficult part of the
diplomatic mission had not yet begun.
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E. The Washington Talks
Laval boarded the train at Pennsylvania Station, he arrived in Washington in the
early aftemoon. 436 He was welcomed at Union Station by the Under Secretary of State
William R. Castle, Jr. and Hoover's Military Aide Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell B.
Hodges. As the French embassy could not accommodate the entire French delegation,
Ambassador Edge had generously offered the use of his house. 437
That same afternoon, Pierre Laval and Ambassador Paul Claudel met with Herbert
and Lou Hoover at the White House. The social niceties rapidly gave way to serious
talks between the heads of state which started at 3:30 p.m. For the substance of this
meeting the Stimson Diary was essential. It would have been logical for Claudel to be
present at the meeting, but he was excluded. Laval probably did not want details of the
meeting to travel back to the Quai d'Orsay until he was ready.

It was a small gathering, Hoover and Stimson with Ogden L. Mills, Secretary of
the Treasury, acting as the American interpreter and Laval with Albert-Buisson as his
translator. The talks that first day were only interrupted by "the official dinner given in
honor of the guests of the Yorktown Sesquicentennial Celebration. "438 Having little taste
for formal happenings and wishing his trip to focus on world affairs, Laval did his utmost
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not to participate in the Yorktown celebration. Marshall Petain represented France at
Yorktown and Laval easily deferred the honors to him, protesting that he could not
possibly infringe upon the position of the hero of Verdun. The gala dinner, however, was
unescapable. Within an hour the formality was over. A mediocre meal served without
wine because of the prohibition offered no reason to linger.
After the dinner, Laval, Stimson, and Hoover resumed their talks. Hoover,

Hoover & Laval followed by Lou Hoover & Josee Laval
courtesy Rene de Chambrun

nicknamed in the American press as the man who never smiled, was not a convivial host.
He had opened the discussions by defining America's position toward Europe. The
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United States had become involved in Europe at the cost of75,000 men and some $40
billion. Yet Europe was politically even more unstable than before. In light of this, the
United States would do nothing more until the political and economic situation improved
in Europe. 439
Laval countered that German revisionism was a great obstacle to stability. Laval
upheld the sanctity of international treaties and suggested that a ten-year political
moratorium might allow the political climate to cool down enough to allow for a solution.
Stimson did not think it was feasible without a concrete hope of a solution. Stimson
alluded to Laval's view, put forth back in July at the London Conference, of a settlement
of the problem of the Danzig corridor. While Laval concurred that he had indeed had
such thought in July, he could not conceive of a solution that would be agreeable to both
the Poles and the Germans. 440 Unknown to Stimson, Laval had approached Bruning on
this very topic, and was told by the chancellor in no uncertain terms that compromise
over the eastern border was impossible. 441
On the question of disarmament Laval suggested that great strides could be made
ifthe United States agreed to a Franco-American "consultative pact" on naval matters.
Hoover thought it was politically impossible and proposed instead "a basic size for an

"Memorandum of Conference with Laval," Stimson, Diary, 23 October 1931. Cointet, Pierre Laval,
111.

439

440

"Memorandum of Conference with Laval," Stimson, Diary, 23 October 1931.

441

"Pilnder memorandum," 1O October 1931, GFMIK2083/K553564 in Warner, Pierre Laval, 44.

142

army, based upon a size large enough merely for an internal police force and then giving
other nations additions to the basic need based upon their respective different needs."
Laval could of course not agree to such a ludicrous program. He very diplomatically
brought up the impracticality of such a plan. 442
Where they did agree was on helping Germany. Hoover suggested that
Germany's payment capacity should be reevaluated at this time. Laval concurred as long
as the commission would operate within the Young plan. Stimson recalled, "then Laval
asked Hoover whether in case the committee reported for a reduction in reparations,
would the United States cooperate[?] Mr. Hoover replied that he would cooperate of
course." Laval then added, however, that he could not consider "an entire abolition of
reparations." One of the Americans, possibly Hoover, then wondered if it would be
possible to transfer the present reparation charge of the German government to German
industry. To the Americans' surprise Laval responded affirmatively.443
The next day Hoover and Stimson met over lunch. Hoover expressed his
frustration over French militarism and cockiness in general and Laval's rejection of his
reduced military concept in particular. Stimson moderated the President's frustration by
pointing out the progress made in France's attitude toward Germany. 444
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F. Laval's political moratorium
What Hoover missed and even keen Stimson did not grasp was that Laval had laid
out the core of his foreign policy vis-a-vis Germany. Even the Franco-German
Commission had been discussed. Laval had devised a plan, one which was known to
very few. None of the biographers of Laval, not even Geoffrey Warner, who used the
Stimson Diary as well, detected Laval's solution to the Franco-German dilemma.
As mentioned above, at the root of all the problems lay the Versailles treaty and
the reparations. But, rather than attempt to abrogate the treaty and scrap the reparations
and the payments to America, which he deemed politically unfeasible, Laval was going to
use them in solving the puzzle.
One of the greatest difficulties for Germany was that the German government was
to pay reparations in gold. Laval had devised a solution which was the same as the
Garrand Winston plan referred to by Stimson. We should add that Flandin as finance
minister, as well as Laval's team of experts, most certainly had a hand in conceiving this
portion of the plan. Flandin had met with Ambassador Edge to discuss unofficially the
possibility of the "transferral of reparation payments to bonded indebtedness," before
Laval's departure for the United States. Edge wrote the State Department, and he was
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certainly correct, that he thought "that Flandin made this visit [ ... ] for the sole purpose
of opening up these possibilities in an unofficial manner. "445
The "Laval-Winston solution" (for lack of a better name) went as follows: The
German government instead of paying the recipients of the reparations would instead pay
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) not in gold but in marks. The BIS would
then lend its funds to the "German industry, public utilities, railroads, and possibly other
private borrowers." The BIS would receive, from its borrowers, long-term obligations
payable in gold. These obligations in tum would be used to pay the reparations. 446 The
obvious benefits would be threefold: The German government would be able to fulfill its
reparation obligation at lesser cost, German enterprises would have access to secure
credit, and the allied nations would receive their reparations.
Economically feasible, the Laval-Winston solution needed time to show a
measurable impact on the German economy, just as the Franco-German commission
needed time to develop its cross border links. Here German irredentism posed a problem.
The solution was a ten-year political moratorium which would allow enough time to
develop the German economy and Franco-German economic ties. In these ten years the
Germans would refrain from demanding the revision of the Versailles treaty and the
French right wing would have nothing to rail against.
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As noted above, Laval had tested the concept of the ten-year moratorium with
Bruning. In his memoirs, Bruning, rejected the idea of a moratorium. According to
Warner, the Chancellor was receptive to the idea though the German statesman had
countered with a one year moratorium. Unfortunately, Stimson thought such a
moratorium was not feasible without a concrete promise about the outcome. But to Laval
these promises would most likely have to involve either the end of reparations or the
redrawing of the Eastern frontier of Germany, two items which were much too explosive
to mention as a possible outcome to a political moratorium.
If Stimson was lukewarm at best, Hoover was an iceberg. This did not bode well

for Laval's concept of a political moratorium. Stimson noted that Laval was not as open
as he had been in Paris. Ike Hoover, the White House Chief Usher, remarked that Laval
was markedly tense: "He was like a prize-fighter sparring for an opening. "447 The
opening was not forthcoming.
On Saturday, 25 October, Laval and his daughter were guests of Mr. and Mrs.
Stimson at their Washington home. Laval and Stimson met alone over breakfast with
Stimson's "own bad French" for interpreter. 448 Laval brought up the political moratorium
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once more; Stimson rejected the idea again. 449 At least the conversation was far easier in
the absence of Hoover.
The body of the topics of discussion had been covered on the-first day. All that
was needed now was to compose the communique. To Stimson's surprise, Ambassador
Claudel would excessively complicate this task. Stimson always had the best relations
with the diplomat, but now Claudel was "captious and pettifogging and took all kinds of
little objections to language." It would take two days to get a statement "as to a
conversation which had taken [ ... ] only seven hours. 450 Possibly Claudel was out of
sorts because of Laval's gentle rebuff of a speech he had prepared: "A Laval doesn't
know how to speak like that," said Laval to his ambassador. 451 Putting together the
communique, however, was a minor problem in light ofBorah's intervention.
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G. Borah: Irresponsible adviser to the world
James Hart conferred upon Borah of Idaho the sobriquet of "irresponsible adviser
of the world" for his ill timed intervention during Laval's visit. 452 Senator William E.
Borah ofldaho was the exceedingly influential Chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations since the passing of Henry Cabot Lodge in December 1924.453 Borah was
cordially despised in Europe where he was accurately seen as the chief opponent of the
ratification of the treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations and the leading
proponent of American isolationism. The French journalists who had accompanied Laval
could not resist the opportunity of an interview with the American ogre on 23 October.
He did not disappoint them. Borah called for the restoration of the Hungarian borders,
the return of the Polish corridor to Germany, and the cancellation of the reparations, and
opposed "any security pacts with France or any other Nations. "454 Granted, Borah had not
expressed anything new. Borah had met with Hoover on 21 October, before the arrival of
Laval, and had discussed all these points, and according to Borah, the president had
agreed with him. 455 Regardless, Borah's statements had the effect of a bombshell. Borah
had come out "vigorously and in an embarrassing way on nearly all the embarrassing
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points there were," recalled Stimson. 456 It was a slap in the face for Hoover, an insult to
the French delegation. When Laval heard of it during the Friday meeting "he raised his
hands and said, 'Why the man lives in Mars."' 457 Laval later answered the journalists who
questioned him that he came to engage in talks with the president not to polemicize with
whomsoever. 458
On Saturday, 24 October 1931 Laval met with Borah at the home of Stimson,
where they were to attend dinner. There was much anticipation regarding this encounter
in the press. After "one of Mabel's [Mrs. Simpson] usual good dinners [ ... ]that helped
carry off the absence of wine for the French," Stimson brought his two guests into his
study so they could debate at ease. 459 "They sat on the sofa and continued it so long that
it pretty nearly busted up the rest of the conversation. [... ] So the rest of the [evening]
was rather like Hamlet without Hamlet." 460 Not surprisingly Laval and Borah disagreed
on all points: the security pact, the Treaty of Versailles, Germany .. ·.
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unfortunate that Borah, the most influential man in American diplomacy, had such a
limited vision of world affairs. Amazingly the conversation remained perfectly cordial.
All guests having departed, Laval, Rist, Bizot and Mills resumed their work on
the communique, driving Stimson mad with repressed frustration as the tedious task
prevented him from going to bed. 462

H. The results of the Hoover Laval Conference
Stimson was not the only one experiencing frustration. Poor Hoover, his plan for
a reduced military had been rebuffed -- albeit gently. A solution to the Danzig corridor
had been retracted. The concept of introducing silver as a standard for the countries that
went off the gold standard was disregarded as a frivolous proposal by Laval and AlbertBuisson. Hoover thought it might have helped "Mexico, India, China and South
America," but Laval dismissed the silver solution as an inflationary proposition adding
that "it was cheaper to inflate paper." 463
Laval did not get a security pact without which the French would never consider
disarmament, nor did he obtain an endorsement for the political moratorium. The
promise to match any reduction of German reparations with a decrease of the French debt
was not put in the communique. What was stated in the joint statement was the
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attachment of France and the United States to the gold standard. The two governments
also agreed that the Banque de France and the Federal Reserve would consult each other
before the transfer of gold. 464 This was welcome news after the run on American gold in
the preceding weeks. In light of the financial crisis, they further agreed to review the
economic situation of Germany before the Hoover moratorium ran its course. 465
These were no doubt meager political results. Yet what could be expected from
the American president a year away from the election, contending with an overall
isolationist public opinion and Congress on the one hand and a French premier reined in
by the very members of his cabinet on the other? The Hoover-Laval encounter, however,
had quite an impact. The Swedish and Norwegian stock exchanges showed recovery for
a time. 466 The American and French press was positively smitten with Laval. Time made
Laval man of the year, an honor never bestowed on a Frenchman before, following no
less than Mahatma Gandhi and preceding Franklin D. Roosevelt. A conquering Laval
riding down Broadway made the cover of L 'Illustration. So there it was: a political draw
could also be a personal triumph.
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CHAPTER
VII

WHEN IT RAINS ...

A. International problems
Laval returned to France on board the Ile-de-France by way of New York. The
revitalization of the Young Plan was his first order of business. Briining's approval for a
reevaluation of Germany's payment capacity was sought and obtained. The Reassessment
Committee meeting in Basie from 7 through 23 December concluded that the Germany
should be dispensed temporarily from paying the conditional portion of the reparations.
The Young plan survived.
Nevertheless, Laval's string of successes began to meet with serious problems.
On 9 January 1932 Bruning announced that Germany would not be able to meet its
obligations. Though on 14 January Bruning moderated his position, and by 13 February
the British aligned with Laval. The reparations were maintained with enormous
difficulties. 467
A major problem was that the World Crisis had reached France, with
unemployment rising to 200,000, and the looming certainty that the 1932 budget would
not balance. Free international trade was under threat, Sweden barred the entry of French
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cheeses, the Netherlands and Spain imposed quotas on French imports, Poland raised
their import taxes, and Italy denounced the Franco-Italian trade agreement.
The latter was possibly the latest obstacle to the possibility of a Laval trip to
Rome. A voyage to Italy would certainly have fittingly concluded Laval's international
tour. However, the project of such a visit would have met with the opposition of the
Italophobes at the Quai d'Orsay and in the department of the Navy, who feared a FrancoItalian accord that would reduce the French fleet in the Mediterranean. 468

B. National problems
Another source of concern was the possible collapse of Laval's support in the
chambers. The Cantonale elections of October 1931 had seen a strong progression of the
Left Radicals (Radicaux de Gauche). While the elections in the cantons -- administrative
entities at the departmental level -- had no impact on the composition of the National
Assembly or the Senate, it did cause the Radicals to rethink their position within the
present assemblies in which they had assumed a somewhat benevolent neutrality toward
Laval. Edouard Herriot remained favorable, at least for the time being, to the present
course of the government, but Edouard Daladier, as the representative of the left branch
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of the Radical Socialists, was looking toward forming a new majority with the
Socialists. 469
All the while, an ailing Briand kept to his bed at the Quai d'Orsay. Laval was
prevented by the "entourage" from visiting the old diplomat. Yet on 2 January 1932
Laval was called in by Briand. The two men talked at length about the political situation.
Briand decided to leave the government, Laval promised to take him back as foreign
minister as soon as he recovered. The old diplomat left for his farm of Cocherel. 470
Worse yet, on 7 January 1932, Minister of War Andre Maginot died, poisoned by
bad oysters. Laval was at his bedside. 471 Maginot had enjoyed the full confidence of
Laval and had full control over his ministry. The disarmament conference in Geneva
opened on 2 February 1932. France needed a credible representative and Laval urged
Tardieu to take over Maginot's ministry. 472 Tardieu accepted. Laval attempted to widen
his majority by including the Radicals in his government. With the departure of Briand
the Radicals pretended to fear that the government would abandon the policy of peace
and they refused participation and all voted against the third Laval government. Laval,
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however, did win the confrontation. On 23 January, 1932, the chamber voted for the new
Laval government, 312 to 261. 473
Laval had recast his government with the same ministers, promoting the under
secretaries, Cathala and Achille Fould, to their respective ministries of the Interior and
Agriculture, reserving the foreign ministry for himself. Still, without the participation of
the Radicals or their neutrality, Laval's center right coalition was in jeopardy.
This was evident to all, and the conservative deputy Georges Mandel -- once
Clemenceau's gray eminence -- proposed an electoral reform which would replace the
plurinominal ballot with an uninominal one. This would favor the right as it would do
away with the reciprocal standing down of the Radicals and the Socialists between two
ballots. A very important amendment giving women the right to vote had been attached
to the reform by Anatole de Monzie. 474 Tardieu, because he associated his vision of a
modem France with that of a strong conservative party -- and also because of the
amendment, as he was a proponent of woman's suffrage -- convinced Laval to put the
weight of the government behind this proposal. 475 The reform passed the assembly on 12
February 1932.476
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The Radicals and the opposition parties were upset. In the senate, on 16 February
Albert Peyronnet (gauche democratique) called for an immediate debate on the overall
policies of Laval's government. Laval asked for a postponement of such a debate for a
few days, because Tardieu was at that very moment putting forth, to the Disarmament
conference, the creation of an international military force that would give teeth to the
League of Nations. This would satisfy France's craving for security, and allow for
disarmament. Laval appealed to the Senators to choose the superior interest of the nation.
In order to emphasize his point Laval risked the survival of the government on a vote to
postpone the debate. On 16 February 1932, Laval was defeated in the Senate, 157 to
132.477
The Laval government collapsed over a calendar issue putting an end to the last
diplomatic effort to bring France and Germany together; the window of opportunity was
closed. When Laval returned to power three years later he would direct a policy of
containment against Germany.

477

Ibid., 111.

156

CONCLUSION
ASSESSMENT OF PIERRE LAVAL IN 1931

The first international crisis Laval faced was the Hoover Moratorium and, despite
the pronouncements of authors such as John W. Wheeler-Bennett, we have seen that
Laval did his utmost to make the Moratorium work. Though the parliamentary coalition
that made Laval's government was not wholly behind him at first, Laval was able to
gather enough outside support to preserve his government and approve the one-year
Hoover Moratorium.
Unfortunately, the German economy was so flawed that the reprieve afforded by
the Hoover moratorium was short-lived. From this renewed financial disaster, however,
an opportunity for improvement of Franco-German relations arose. Laval's first
encounter with Bruning was, something of a missed opportunity. Had Laval been able to
offer Briining the half a billion dollars without the conditions, history might have taken a
different tum. It is unlikely, nonetheless, that the loan would have been enough to make
Germans forget the so-called "war guilt clause" and the Danzig corridor. Still, it was to
Laval's credit that the meeting did not tum into a diplomatic disaster.
Over the course of the Laval-Bruning meeting, the two grew to appreciate each
other. From this first missed opportunity arose the French visit to Berlin. Though the
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results were meager, it too was a positive step toward Franco-German understanding.
Laval said of the meetings with Brilning:
I did my best, I was ever conscious of embodying my country. It gave me
great courage and great strength. I always spoke honestly with my
interlocutors. I recall a poignant moment when Mr. Brilning and I sensed
the insurmountable chasm between us. His face was so sad that I felt sorry
for him. ["]In my situation,r'J I told him, ["]you would not speak
otherwise.["] He acquiesced with a nod. I added then: "Mr. Brilning, let
us put forth all efforts so that we may one day meet again. "478
The encounter with Hoover was not all it could have been. Author James E.
Pollard wrote that Hoover changed upon becoming President; where he had been open,
willing to communicate, upon taking office he became inflexible, controlling, and
secretive. 479 It was apparent during Laval's visit that Hoover was not willing to try to
compromise on anything. This must have been very disconcerting to Laval, especially
after his candid meetings with Stimson. Granted Hoover had a lot on his plate: with the
national income dropping to half in the span of his presidency, the Bonus Marchers
camping on the Mall, the invasion of Manchuria, to name but a few problems Hoover
faced. Laval had thoroughly prepared for the visit, won over the American press, and
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handled the Borah incident with skill -- but he could not get through to the humorless
president.
Being able to conduct any sort of policy in France's Third Republic was a
remarkable achievement in itself. As to the length of Laval's stay in power, it was
equivalent to the better performing governments. Yet the key question for any
statesperson is whether the goal(s) of his or her administration were accomplished?
Unfortunately, with Laval the answer is no. Laval was unable to convince Brilning and
Stimson of the viability of a ten-year political moratorium. Yet Laval's year in office was
not bereft of accomplishments. It was a year of positive beginnings which saw improved
diplomatic relations with Germany, the United States, and even Great Britain. It was a
year of personal successes: In 1931 Laval was a popular politician at home and as inthe
case of the United States, abroad. Had Laval's political career ended here he might have
been remembered like Louis Barthou as a man who could have averted war "if only."
But, as the French say, with "ifs" one can put Paris in a bottle. The reality was that
Laval's career did not end in 1931; he went on to serve a very difficult term as premier in
1935 and to serve in the Vichy government during World War II.
Many have thought to draw parallels between Laval's dealing with Germany in
the 1930s and the 1940s. Such endeavors have little merit for circumstances were
obviously very different. In 1931 Laval was the head of a strong and free state; in 1940
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he was not. In 1931 Laval was dealing with a democratic Germany; in 1940 he was not.
In 1931 Laval was negotiating with an honest and upstanding man; in 1940 he was not.
Did this study give any insights to Laval's personality, which would explain
Laval in 1940? Perhaps, but in order to explain one would have to agree as to what he
did. To borrow Chambrun's words, was Laval a "traitor or a patriot?" This question
cannot be answered in a paragraph. But ifhe did betray France, he did not do it for the
common motivations of money, ideology, sex, or even power. If one can agree that
betrayal without motivation is not possible, then Chambrun must be deemed correct in his
affirmation that Laval sacrificed himself to protect the French. However, when betrayal
is loosely defined to mean that all who do not fight provide aid to the enemy, then Laval
must be a traitor. Over the last few years, although I have spent thousands of hours with
Laval in 1931, I cannot answer that enduring question. The chief objective of this study
was to show Laval as he might have been seen by his contemporaries in 1931. I hope the
reader feels I reached that goal.
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EPILOGUE

When Briand, feeling better, returned to Paris in March, Laval was no longer in
power to give him back his post a the Quai d'Orsay. 480 Laval had returned to the Labor
ministry in the third Tardieu government. Briand died on 7 March 1932. The old
diplomat was given a national funeral in Paris. His long time opponent Tardieu gave the
eulogy.
Heinrich Briining's government outlived Laval's by a few months. Hindenburg,
victorious over Hitler in the presidential elections of 1932, blamed his chancellor for his
difficult victory and replaced him with Franz von Papen. In 1934, Briining fled from
Nazi Germany -- first to the Netherlands, then to Switzerland and England. He
eventually came to the United States in 1939 to become a professor at Harvard. Upon his
death in 1970 in Norwich, Vermont, Briining's body was repatriated to Germany and
given a national funeral. On that solemn occasion he was recognized by the entire
German parliament, both right and left, as a man of integrity and as a selfless leader. 481
At the Lausanne conference (16 June-18 July 1932), the new Premier Edouard
Herriot fought the German request for the total abandonment of the war reparations.
Papen had the support of MacDonald. Although the debt was reduced to three billion
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gold marks, it would never be paid. Papen also wanted France to annul the "war guilt
clause." Herriot refused emphatically. Von Papen, livid, left screaming "You'll get
Hitler, you'll get Hitler." 482
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Appendix A
The composition of the Laval governments 1931-1932
and party affiliation(s) when known483

27 January 1931 - May 1931
President du Conseil & ministre de l'Interieur ............... Pierre Laval, (S)(independant)
Vice-president du conseil
et Garde des Sceaux ....... Leon Berard, (S)(Parti Republicain Democratique et Social/URD)*
Affaires etrangeres ................................... Aristide Briand (D)(independant)
Guerre ............................. Andre Maginot (D)(Action democratique et sociale)
Marine .................................... Charles Dumont (D)(gauche democratique)
Air ....................................... Jacques-Louis Dumesnil (D) (independant)
Instruction publique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mario Roustan (S)(gauche democratique)
Finances . Pierre-Etienne Flandin (D)(President of alliance democratique/republicain de gauche)
Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fran~ois Pietri (D)(alliance democratique/republicain de gauche)
Travaux Public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maurice Deligne (D)(gauche radicale)
Travail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Adolphe Landry (D)(gauche radicale)
Commerce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Louis Rollin (D)(republicain de gauche)
Agriculture . Andre Tardieu (D)(parti republicain democratique et social/republicain de gauche)
Marine marchande . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Charles De Chappedelaine (D)(gauche radicale)
Pensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Auguste Champetiers de Ribes (D)(Parti Democrate Populaire)
Sante Publique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Camille Blaisot (D)(URD)
P.T.T.......................................... Charles Guemier (D)(gauche radicale)
Colonies ........... Paul Reynaud (D)(alliance democratique/action democratique et sociale)
Sous-secretaires d'Etat.
Presidence du Conseil
et Economie nationale ...... Andre Fran~ois-Poncet (D)(Parti Rep. Democratique et Social)**
Interieur ................. Pierre Cathala (D)(gauche sociale et radicale/radical independant)
Beaux-Arts ................................ Maurice Petsche (D)(republicain de gauche)
Colonies ............................................ Blaise Diagne (D)(independant)
Agricuture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Achille Fould (D)(URD)
Commerce ............................ Charles Frey (D)(action d6mocratique et sociale)
Travaux publics et Tourisme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gaston Gerard (D)(gauche radicale)
Travail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maurice Foulon (D)(no label)
Air ..................................... Etienne Riche (D)(gauche sociale et radicale)
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Marine Marchande ............................ Pierre Dignac (D)(republicain de gauche)
Education physique ...................... Emile Morinaud (D)(gauche sociale et radicale)
Enseignement technique ...................... Charles Pomaret (D)(republicain socialiste)
May 1931
Representation of the same to the new president Paul Doumer
12-14 January, 1932
Few changes after Aristide Briand's retirement and the death of Andre Maginot on 7 January
1932:
Presidence du Conseil & Affaires Etrangeres . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pierre Laval
Guerre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Andre Tardieu
Interieur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pierre Cathala
Agriculture ......................................................... Achille Fould
(S) Senator
(D) Deputy
*URD =Union republicaine democratique
**Andre Franc;ois-Poncet upon becoming ambassador to Germany was replaced by C.-J.
Gignoux (D) (Action democratique et sociale).
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Appendix B
French presidents and Premiers
from 18 February 1906 to 10 July 1940484
Armand F ALLIERES : president du 18 fevrier 1906 au 18 fevrier 1913
•Maurice ROUVIER (3) du 18 fev. 1906 au 7 mars 1906
•Ferdinand SARRIEN (1) du 14 mars 1906 au 20 oet. 1906
•Georges CLEMENCEAU (1) du 25 oct. 1906 au 20 juil. 1909
•Aristide BRIAND (1) du 24 juil. 1909 au 2 nov. 1910
•Aristide BRIAND (2) du 4 nov. 1910 au 27 fev. 1911
•Ernest MONIS (1) du 2 mars 1911au23 juin 1911
•Joseph CAILLAUX (1) du 27 juin 1911au11 jan. 1912
•Raymond POINCARE (1) du 14 jan. 1912 au 21jan.1913
•Aristide BRIAND (3) du 21 jan. 1913 au 18 fev. 1913
Raymond POINCARE: president du 18 fevrier 1913 au 18 fevrier 1920
•Aristide BRIAND (4) du 18 fev. 1913 au 18 mars 1913
•Louis BARTHOU (1) du 22 mars 1913 au 2 dee. 1913
•Gaston DOUMERGUE (1) du 9 dee. 1913 au 2 juin 1914
•Alexandre RIBOT (4) du 9 juin 1914 au 12juin 1914
•Rene VIVIANI (1) du 13 juin 1914 au 26 juil. 1914
•Rene VIVIANI (2) du 26 juil. 1914 au 29 oet. 1915
•Aristide BRIAND (5) du 29 oet. 1915 au 12 dee. 1916
•Aristide BRIAND (6) du 12 dee. 1916 au 17 mars 1917
•Alexandre RIBOT (5) du 20 mars 1917 au 7 sept. 1917
•Paul PAINLEVE (1) du 12 sept. 1917 au 13 nov. 1917
•Georges CLEMENCEAU (2) du 16 nov. 1917 au 18 jan. 1920
•Alexandre MILLBRAND (1) du 20 jan. 1920 au 18 fev. 1920
Paul DESCHANEL : president du 17 fevrier 1920 au 21 septembre 1920
•Alexandre MILLBRAND (2) du 18 fev. 1920 au 23 sept. 1920
Alexandre MILLBRAND : president du 23 sept. 1920 au 11 juin 1924
•Georges LEYGUES (1) du 24 sept. 1920 au 12jan. 1921
• Aristide BRIAND (7) du 16 jan. 1921 au 12 jan. 1922
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• Raymond POINCARE (2) du 15 jan. 1922 au 29 mars 1924
•Raymond POINCARE (3) du 29 mars 1924 au ler juin 1924
• Frederic FRAN<;OIS-MARCHAL (1) du 8 juin 1924 au 10 juin 1924
Gaston DOUMERGUE : president du 13 juin 1924 au 13 juin 1931
•Edouard HERRIOT (1) du 14 juin 1924 au 10 avr. 1925
• Paul P AINLEVE (2) du 17 avr. 1925 au 27 oct. 1925
• Paul PAINLEVE (3) du 29 oct. 1925 au 22 nov. 1925
•Aristide BRIAND (8) du 28 nov. 1925 au 6 mars 1926
• Aristide BRIAND (9) du 9 mars 1926 au 15 juin 1926
• Aristide BRIAND (10) du 23 juin 1926 au 17 juil. 1926
•Edouard HERRIOT (2) du 19 juil. 1926 au 21 juil. 1926
•Raymond POINCARE (4) du 23 juil. 1926 au 6 nov. 1928
•Raymond POINCARE (5) du 18 nov. 1928 au 26 juil. 1929
• Aristide BRIAND (11) du 29 juil. 1929 au 22 oct. 1929
•Andre TARDIEU (1) du 3 nov. 1929 au 17 fev. 1930
•Camille CHAUTEMPS (1) du 21fev.1930 au 25 fev. 1930
• Andre TARDIEU (2) du 2 mars 1930 au 4 dee. 1930
•Theodore STEEG (1) du 13 dee. 1930 au 22jan. 1931
•Pierre LAVAL (1) du 27 jan. 1931 au 13 juin 1931
Paul DOUMER: president du 13 mai 1931au6 mai 1932, assassine
•Pierre LAVAL (2) du 13 juin 1931au12jan. 1932
•Pierre LAVAL (3) du 14 jan. 1932 au 16 fev. 1932
•Andre TARDIEU (3) du 20 fev 1932 au 10 mai 1932
Albert LEBRUN : president du 10 mai 1932 au 1o juillet 1940, reelu
•Edouard HERRIOT (3) du 3 juin 1932 au 14 dee. 1932
•Joseph PAUL BONCOURT (1) du 18 dee. 1932 au 28 jan. 1933
•Edouard DALADIER (1) du 31 jan. 1933 au 24 oct. 1933
•Albert SARRAUT (1) du 26 oct. 1933 au 24 nov. 1933
•Camille CHAUTEMPS (2) du 26 nov. 1933 au 27 jan. 1934
•Edouard DALADIER (2) du 30 jan. 1934 au 7 fev. 1934
•Gaston DOUMERGUE (2) du 9 fev. 1934 au 8 nov. 1934
•Pierre-Etienne FLANDIN (1) du 8 nov. 1934 au 31mai1935
• Femand BOUISSON (1) du ler juin 1935 au 4 juin 1935
• Pierre LAVAL (4) du 7 juin 1935 au 22 jan. 1936
• Albert SARRAUT (2) du 24 jan. 1936 au 4 juin 1936
•Leon BLUM (1) du 4 juin 1936 au 21juin1937
•Camille CHAUTEMPS (3) du 29 juin 1937 au 14 jan. 1938
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•Camille CHAUTEMPS (4) du 18jan. 1938 au 10 mars 1938
•Leon BLUM (2) du 13 mars 1938 au 8 avr. 1938
•Edouard DALADIER (3) du 12 avr. 1938 au 11mai1939
•Edouard DALADIER (4) du 11mai1939 au 14 sept. 1939
•Edouard DALADIER (5) du 14 sep. 1939 au 20 mars 1940
•Paul REYNAUD (1) du 22 mars 1940 au 16 juin 1940
•Philippe PETAIN (1) du 16 juin 1940 au 11 juil. 1940
Regime de Vichy (10 juillet 1940 - 2 novembre 1945)
Gouvemement provisoire de la Republique fran<;aise (3 juin 1944 - 2 novembre 1945)
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AppendixC
Notes on the Third Republic;
Constitutional laws, Institutions and the party system
France's Third Republic was born in 1875. Its constitutional laws were drafted
not so much as a reaction to the previous regime -- Napoleon Ill's empire -- but as a
compromise between the dominant forces of the Republicans, the Conservatives, the
Monarchists and the Bonapartists. The Republicans upheld the universal suffrage and the
national assembly, the Monarchists the presidency and the senate. The Royalists were in
this unusual position of supporting a presidency because the pretenders -- Henri Comte de
Chambord (Bourbon) and Henri Comte de Paris (Orleans) -- did not dare seize the power
within their reach. The Royalists hoped that the house of Orleans would eventually
produce a King who would, in time, take the place of the president.
From this compromise was born a republic with a chamber of deputies, a senate,
and a president. The deputies and eventually all the senators were elected by direct
universal suffrage. The president was elected by the joint chambers. The president had
the power to name the premier and to dissolve the chambers. The extent of the power of
the presidency was tested in 1877. President Patrice de MacMahon challenged the
Republican majority by choosing as premier the Due de Broglie, defender of order and
religion against Republican anti-clericalism. De Broglie was also an Orleanist. The
Republicans won the elections, establishing the sovereignty of the National Assembly.
The Senate, which had been sought by the conservatives and the monarchists as a
bulwark against the National Assembly, would rapidly evolve through the pressure of the
Universal Suffrage into a republican institution as well.
The President would at best exert a power of influence. With rare exeptions, such
as Raymond Poincarre, the presidents chosen by the combined chambers were not
significant politicians. Their greatest quality was often not to have offended anyone.
The executive power rested with the President du Conseil des Ministres (Premier)
and the ministers. "They were responsible to both houses and were obliged to
countersign (individually) every act of the President."485 This meant that the defection of
one minister could cause the collapse of the entire government. Although not mandated
by the constitution, ministers would normally resign over the defeat of a measure. This

Chris Cook and John Paxton European Political Facts, 1918-1973 (Macmillan Press LTD, New York,
1975), 54.

4ss

168

explains why "between 1870 and 1934 France had no less than 88 ministries with an
average life of less than nine months"486
The executive was further weakened by the party fragmentation. Modem political
parties did not develop until the tum of the century. The tables below only show a
portion of the party division in 1928 and 1932, as parties such as the Union republicaine
democratique were often asssociations of like-minded parties. The division between right
and left is highly subjective when it came to the center parties such as the Radicaux
Socialistes who shifted their weigth from one side of the assembly to the other as
circumstances dictated.
The political labels could also be misleading: the Republicains de Gauche (Left
Republicans), for example, was one of the conservative parties. The gauche label
probably meant they were not Catholic. The religious divide among the conservative
parties signified that a government of the Right was never sustainable for long. One
should also know that conservatives in France endorsed centralized government; by the
same token the Socialists did not want the collectivization of the land since a large
portion of their electorate in the south were independent farmers. To further complicate
matters the politicians did not always keep their political labels from one election to the
next. Perhaps the most unusual behavior was exhibited by the true leftist parties such as
the Socialists and communists who would often refuse to participate in or head a
government for governing was decidedly too Bourgeois.
Though the Third Republic was only suspended in July 1940, it did not survive
the war, it officially came to an end on 2 November 1945 giving way to the Fourth
Republic. The Fourth Republic suffered the same instability as the previous republic, it
experienced twenty-five cabinets from its investiture on 27 October 1946 to its abrogation
on 4 October 1958. The Fifth Republic, under the guidance of De Gaulle, was given a
very strong executive power in the person of a president elected by direct universal
suffrage for seven years. France has since then enjoyed great stability, only experiencing
twenty-one governments over the last forty years.
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The Mai 1928 legislative elections, victory of the Right487
11,396,000 registered voters
9,470,000 voted
Seats in the National Assembly
Conservateurs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Union republicaine democrate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Independants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Republicain de gauche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1OI
Democrates Populaires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Radicaux independants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Radicaux socialistes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Republicains socialistes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Socialistes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Socialistes communistes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Communistes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l 0
The October 1929 senatorial elections488
Seats in the Senate
Droite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Union republicaine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Union democratique et radicale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Gauche republicame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Gauche democratique radicale et radicale socialiste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Socialistes (SFIO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Non-Inscrits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
The Mai 1932 legislative elections, victory of the Left489
11,561,751 registered voters
9,579,482 voted
Seats in the National Assembly
Conservateurs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Union republicaine democrate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Independants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Republicain de gauche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Democrates Populaires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Radicaux independants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Radicaux socialistes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Republicains socialistes ............................................................... 37
Socialistes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Socialistes communistes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Communistes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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AppendixD
1931 Man of the Year:
Pierre Laval490
This article appeared in "Man of the Year" issue featuring Pierre Laval as he
might have appeared in 1931 by the Americans, inaccuracies included.
On the last day of 1931, who loomed calm, masterful and popular as Man of the
Year?
"It has been a lean year for everyone," said Prime Minister James Ramsay
MacDonald with suppressed emotion. Then, faced by the conference.that is to meet Jan.
18 to do something about Reparations, he burst out, "For God's sake let us meet now!"
"From this terrifying spectacle which the world presents we must raise our eyes to
Heaven!" cried Pope Pius XI in his Christmas message. "It is to be feared that God will
leave men to themselves and that would be most terrible ruin. 11
The year 1931 pitched even Colonel Lindbergh into heathen waters; sent
Mahatma Gandhi disgruntled back to India; faced Josef Stalin with ragged gaps in the
Five-Year Plan; failed to produce a Fascist government under Adolf Hitler (potential Man
of 1932). But who rose from obscurity to world prominence, steered a Great Power safely
through 1931, closed the year on a peak of popularity among his countrymen?
Only one man did these things and at the height of his sudden greatness wagged
an explanatory finger at President Hoover. The keynote of 1931 was sounded by
Man-of-the-Year Pierre Laval as he sailed for Washington: "A severe correctional and
disciplinary period is indicated."
French Coolidge. Twelve months ago Pierre Laval was as obscure -- even in
France -- as Governor Calvin Coolidge before the Boston police strike.
Swart as a Greek, this compact little Auvergnat (son of a village butcher in
Auvergne, south-central France) was a Senator of no party, an Independent. The public
neither knew that he always wears a white wash tie (cheapest and unfading) nor cared to

"1931 Man of the Year: Pierre Laval" Time, 4 January 1932 was generated from RTF source by
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figure out that his name spells itself backward as well as forward. Addicted to scowling,
didactic (he once taught school), possessed of mellow but unexciting voice, identified
with no conspicuous cause or movement, Senator Laval was also too young to be
noticeable in France in January 1931. He was only 4 7 and France likes its Premiers to be
over 60. The extreme youth of Pierre Laval was made glaring by the fact that France had
just dispensed with a Premier whom many considered "much too ym~ng," brilliant Andre
Tardieu, 54, whose Cabinet was brought down by the Oustric scandal.
Worst of all, a good many Frenchmen who had vaguely heard of "The Man in the
White Tie" understood that during the War he was a slacker and afterwards a Communist.
In 1914, being already Mayor of the proletarian Paris suburb of Aubervilliers, he was
elected to the Chamber of Deputies by his old constituents as a Socialist. He did not
enlist in the Army. When drafted he served briefly at the front [sic] as a common poilu.
His Socialist views caused him to orate directly after the War against the Treaty of
Versailles. In 1919 he lost his seat as Deputy, quarreled with some of his Socialist
colleagues, remained friendly with others and is said to have been briefly enrolled at one
time as both a Socialist [sic] and a Communist [sic], not being sure which way the cat of
popular sentiment would jump [sic].
Aubervilliers was the irresolute young statesman's salvation. He was and he
remains today Mayor of Aubervilliers. Unshakably rooted in this Paris suburb he
cultivated the friends he had made as a Deputy, notably that bald, enigmatic millionaire
Joseph Caillaux, onetime Premier. In 1924 Mayor Laval again sought and won election as
a Deputy, not as a Socialist this time but as a moderate Republican.
Shrewd Aubervilliers understood. Her beloved Pierre was doffing his radical cap
and putting on a moderate political coat to match those of his moneyed friends. Why not?
Great Aristide Briand had made exactly the same switch; so had Alexandre Millerand,
President of the Republic.
Less than a year later the Auvergnat, diligent in his attendance upon both M.
Caillaux and M. Briand, was rewarded by the minor portfolio of Public Works in a
Painleve Cabinet which starred Foreign Minister Briand and Finance Minister Caillaux.
When Patron Briand shortly came in as Premier he took Protege Laval under his wing,
gave him a course in Chamber intrigue as secretary general of the Prime Minister's office,
graduated him prematurely in 1926 as Minister of Justice.
Unfortunately Premier Briand had no head for finance. The collapse of the franc
drove him back to his favorite post of Foreign Minister. In came great Premier Raymond
Poincare to save the franc, and incidentally to blight the careers of several Briand
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satellites. Ousted Pierre Laval contrived to get himself elected a Senator from the
Department of the Seine (which he has since represented). He dropped back for several
years into obscurity as a quiet Independent. Still close to Old Brer Briand, he also made
himself close to Young Andre Tardieu.
In 1929-30 the Tardieu skyrocket went up, twice. In the first Tardieu Cabinet
there was no Pierre Laval; in the second he was unobtrusively Minister of Labor; and
when this Cabinet fell his chance almost came. Briand and Tardieu both insisted that
Laval be asked to form a Cabinet. He tried and he failed, because by a typical quirk of
"loyalty to my friend Andre" (Tardieu) he insisted that in a Cabinet of which he was
Premier his friend must be a Minister. To form a cabinet including Friend Andre at that
moment proved impossible. Again M. Laval slipped into obscurity; but 1931 was just
around the comer. Briefly Theodore Steeg, former French Resident General of Morocco,
headed a shaky, stop-gap Cabinet.
Laval's Year. On the morning of Jan. 24, 1931 there was again a French crisis.
The Steeg Cabinet had fallen following charges that the Minister of Agriculture had
speculated in wheat. Importunate telegrams flashed from the President's Palace to Brer
Briand at Geneva begging him to become Premier for the twelfth time.
Surfeited with such honors Briand wired his courteous but absolute refusal,
suggesting Pierre Laval. By this time the Oustric scandal was somewhat cold, the
constantly shifting line- up of the Chamber had altered, and sturdy Auvergnat Laval was
able not only to form a Cabinet but to smuggle into it as Minister of Agriculture his
friend Andre Tardieu.
Thoroughly befuddled were such correspondents as supposed Andre Tardieu to be
roughly ten times as big a man as Pierre Laval. One cabled: "The Tardieu Cabinet has
been reformed with Laval as Premier." Others assumed that Protege Laval would dance
inevitably to Patron Briand's tunes. Scarcely anyone realized the tremendous will-to-rule
of the Man of the Year. Perhaps Georges Mandel, long the most intimate colleague of
"Tiger" Clemenceau, had a glimmering of what was coming. "The Laval Cabinet has
nothing to fear," he wrote. "It will last if it gives the impression that it is working .... This
country likes a Government that really governs."
Straight through 1931, while other Premiers or Presidents hesitated, wavered and
in some cases fell, Pierre Laval gave month after month the consistent impression that he
and his Government were working, are working:
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February: Just getting into his stride, Premier Laval leaned on the stooped
shoulder of old Brer Briand in Chamber debate, backed him in pledging France to
observe the One-year Naval Holiday proposed by Foreign Minister Dino Grandi ofltaly.
March: Faced by Red riots in French Indo-China, the Premier convened the High
Colonial Council in Paris for the first time in three years and studied critically the results
of guillotining 700 native Communists in the past two years--with the result that Minister
of Colonies Paul Reynaud is now in the Far East "sympathetically examining native
grievances."
April: Foreign Minister Aristide Briand's conciliatory policy toward Germany
having been discredited in French eyes by the revelation that Germany and Austria
planned a zollverein (customs union), Premier Laval put tactful pressure on his own
Foreign Office, forcing Old Brer Briand to take a "stronger line" which later forced
zollverein into the World Court, where it died.
May: When the Chamber and Senate sit together as the National Assembly at
Versailles and vote for the President of France, who shall vote first is determined by
opening the dictionary at random. Last spring the dictionary opened at L. Alphabetically
no other L name in the National Assembly could beat Laval. Having cast the first vote
Premier Laval saw his shaggy old mentor Aristide Briand heartbreakingly defeated for
the Presidency, which fell to water-drinking, penny-pinching Paul Doumer.
Opening in May the French Colonial Exposition proved phenomenally successful
in a bad year, strengthened the "impression" that the Laval Cabinet was "working."
June: Premier Laval showed his tough Auvergnat mettle by holding up the
Hoover One-Year Moratorium single-handed, hurling his famed defy--"President Hoover
can entrench himself behind his Congress and I can entrench myself ~ehind the
Chamber"--and hanging on doggedly until the Moratorium was modified into a form
acceptable to France.
July: M. Laval signed the Moratorium Accord after negotiations at the French
Foreign Office with Statesman Stimson and Secretary Mellon, "to which Briand was
brought in like an aged grandmother whom it is desired not to leave out of the family
festivities," as venomous "Pertinax" remarked in L'Echo de Paris.
August: The Premier in his character of Worker, Driver, Leader recuperated in the
grand manner by taking the cure at Vichy where go so many French, United States and
British tycoons.
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September: Taking Old Brer Briand in tow, Premier Laval junketed to Berlin,
conferred with Chancellor Brilning and Foreign Minister Curtis (since resigned),
achieved little or nothing, but boosted his fame enormously and is said to have made a
warm friend of Dr. Brilning. ("What a man!" Visitor Laval exclaimed to beaming German
newshawks. "I wish there were more such men in France!")
October: Leaving his Foreign Minister and his wife behind and taking his
daughter Josee (Josette to him) along, Pierre Laval made the journey to Washington. D.C.
that stamped his name upon millions of United States minds and swelled his fame
throughout the world.
President Hoover is well known to dislike almost all Frenchmen. He and Premier
Laval had high words which they called "free and frank." Smoking United States cigarets
at the furious rate of 80 per day, the didactic Frenchman in striped trousers, black jacket,
white tie and suede-topped buttoned shoes wagged his short forefinger at the President in
high-laced shoes and conservative business suit, making hotly such points as that France
will not stand for having another Moratorium thrust forward from the United States
"suddenly and brutally." (Never understood in the United States, the French position was
and still is that President Hoover had a perfect right to be as "sudden" as he liked about
sacrificing for one year $257,000,000 due the United States (that being his own business
and Congress not being in session): but that the President had no right "brutally" to insist
that France make a similar abrupt sacrifice of $97,000,000, that being Premier Laval's
business and the French Chamber being not only in session but twice as angry as
Congress when Congress finally convened and voted.) Equally blunt was Mr. Hoover,
according to some reports, in challenging the French thesis of "Security before
Disarmament," insisting on "real disarmament" when the Disarmament Conference
meets.
Concrete result of the White House negotiations was almost nil, Premier Laval
departing vastly puffed and pleased by a verbal agreement that he should summon the
German Ambassador on his return to Paris and start Germany taking the initiative for a
final settlement of her troubles by appealing under the Young Plan for a committee to
study them, which has now been done.
November: The complete dominance of Premier Laval over what was once
supposed to be someone else's Cabinet was dramatically pointed up when 69-year-old
Aristide Briand collapsed in the Chamber Nov. 17 and lay for a few moments crumpled
down upon his desk. As chairman of the League Council (both before and after this
collapse) Old Brer Briand lost further prestige by failing utterly to restrain the aggression
of Japan in Manchuria. Meanwhile short Premier Laval and his tremendously tall, broad175

shouldered and aggressive Finance Minister, Pierre Etienne Flandin, were fighting
through the Chamber their fiscal program for next year.
December: Chamber and Senate passed not only numerous routine Budget bills
and the like but also approved several highly controversial steps involving the personal
prestige of Premier Laval and Finance Minister Flandin:
1) The loaning from the Treasury to the Bank of France of $100,000,000 to cover
the Bank's present paper loss on Sterling which it still holds. Premier Laval, it was
revealed, kept the Bank under pressure during the summer to "stand by the pound" when
its directors wanted to sell Sterling.
2) The loaning of $12,000,000 to the French Line to complete their unnamed
super-super-liner.
3) The adoption of a $140,000,000 program of public works to relieve French
unemployment, two-thirds of this sum to be furnished by the Treasur"y and one-third by
local bodies. According to Laval Cabinet official estimates there are unemployed some
500,000 Frenchmen, compared to some 7,200,000 United States citizens.
On Christmas Eve the Chamber gave Premier Laval a straight vote of confidence
315 to 255, then adjourned to the second Tuesday in January, leaving the Man of the year
unshaken, triumphant. How great is his achievement may be measured by the fact that
only four French Premiers since the War have been able to remain in power for as much
as one year.
Pierre Laval in his year-end public address at Chapelle-la- Reine nailed to his
Cabinet's mast a French policy (practical or impractical) respecting Reparations which
was endorsed next day by virtually the whole French press: "We will not allow
Reparations to be sacrificed to private debts!"
"Tenez hon! Hold tight!" shouted a delighted auditor.
"I always do!" cried the Man-of-the-Year. "We will not let the Young Plan be tom
up!"
Nation of the Year? France closed 1931 with vastly greater gold stocks than any
other European state (the United States has half again as much); she could count her
unemployed in hundreds of thousands while Britain and Germany counted theirs in
millions; but her trade balance has turned adverse: her United Statesmeric tourists
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dwindled from 300,000 in 1929 to 100,000 in 1931. The conviction is strong among
Frenchmen that they are just entering hard times.
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